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In this issue, six articles explore the Middle East crisis and its origins. Our introductory author sets the stage by tracing the history of the Middle East conflict from "The earliest organized claim of the Jews to Palestine . . . [in] 1897," when no Arab voice was raised in protest, to the war of 1956.

The Arab-Israeli Dispute in Perspective*

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DISCUSSIONS OF the Arab-Israeli conflict are replete with interpretations which attempt to explain it as a moral, psychological, legal or political "case" abstracted from history. According to these interpretations, the conflict involves two sets of incompatible claims, attitudes and points of view.

On the Arab side, there is the prescriptive right to a land inhabited for more than a thousand years, the right of self-determination, the shock to the dignity of a once great people, the fear of Israeli expansionism, the plight of one million refugees.

On the Israeli side, there is the undissolved and indissoluble bond to the land which had been the cradle of the Jewish heritage, the urge of Jews barred from the nations of Europe to reconstruct a national life of their own in the land of their ancestors, their need for a refuge among brethren when all other havens were denied, and their internationally recognized right to a share of Palestine.

This abstract approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict may be of some use in suggesting the

motivational forces that drive the parties. It is of no use at all in any attempt to understand a concrete series of events such as the recent June, 1967, crisis. For this, a survey of the actual history of the Arab-Israeli dispute is needed.

The earliest organized claim of Jews to Palestine goes back to 1897. In that year, the first World Zionist Congress, assembled in Basle, Switzerland, at the initiative of Theodor Herzl, declared as its objective the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine secured by public law, and set up an organization to pursue this objective systematically. At that time, Palestine was under the Ottoman Turks and was inhabited by nearly half a million Arabs and some 50,000 Jews. No Arab voice was raised to protest against the Zionist claim; and the Ottoman sultan, the sovereign master of Palestine, far from taking umbrage at it, received Theodor Herzl to discuss his organization's program before politely turning it down. All the efforts of Zionist diplomacy to get third parties to intercede with the Ottoman government to change its attitude proved of no avail until World War I broke out. In the meantime,

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several thousand Jews from Eastern Europe had made their way into Palestine and had begun practical nation-building work; but in the absence of a political authorization, this work was bound to prove nothing more than a symbol of the desire of some Jews to return to their homeland.

World War I transformed the prospects for the Zionists. The Ottoman Empire joined Germany and Austria against Britain, France and Russia; this meant that the defeat of the Central Powers would spell the end of Ottoman dominion in the Middle East. As the Entente powers began to ponder the future of the Middle East even while the war continued, the Zionists urged the British (who bore the brunt of the fighting in the area and had shown some sympathy in the past for the idea of a Jewish homeland) to sponsor the charter the Zionists needed to build their National Home in Palestine. Thanks to the exertions of Chaim Weizmann, they finally succeeded, and on November 2, 1917, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration which said:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing, non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The declaration was eventually approved by Britain's allies and was incorporated in the terms of the mandate over Palestine granted Britain by the League of Nations.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

The Balfour Declaration is now viewed by Arab nationalists and by some historians as the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is indeed true insofar as Zionist settlement of Palestine on a large scale would have been impossible without it; it is not true insofar as it implies that the Balfour Declaration made the emergence of Israel inevitable. Between one event and the other, there were many intervening causes which were by no

means predetermined and which depended decisively on choices made or avoided by several actors, including the Arabs themselves.

By the time the Balfour Declaration was issued, there was already an incipient Arab nationalist movement which hoped to inherit control over the Arab-inhabited territories from the Ottomans. Britain had already promised Sherif Hussein of Mecca and his son Faisal, the authorized leaders of the movement, support for Arab independence in most such territories in exchange for their launching a revolt against the Ottoman authorities. Whether or not Palestine was part of the promised area has been subsequently debated *ad nauseam*; but the more important underlying question of Britain's discretion to promise or not to promise Palestine at all has seldom been raised until recently. This question is important not because of its moral-legal aspect, with which we are not concerned here, but because it reflects a political reality which gave Britain the freedom to act with little more than her conscience to consider: the fledgling Arab nationalist movement was so weak and so dependent on British support for the realization of its aspirations elsewhere that the British felt they could induce its leaders to accept the Balfour Declaration regarding Palestine, with the proper reassuring interpretations.

In this they proved correct. Faisal (later King Faisal I of Iraq) did indeed express his approval of the declaration on several occasions, and this allowed the British more easily to persist in the intent they had expressed and for the Versailles Peace Conference to sanction that intent and convert it into a binding international legal obligation.

The British retained a decisive measure of discretion over the fate of Palestine for some 15 years after the approval of the mandate by the League of Nations. During that period, the Arab nationalist movement reversed Faisal's guarded approval of the Balfour Declaration and explicitly reasserted on numerous occasions its claim over Palestine; but its opposition was weak and ineffective. In 1920, it became segmented as a result of the division of the Arab territories into sev-

eral political entities under French and British control and each part became absorbed in local struggles. In Palestine itself, the movement was left with hardly any strength. As the application of the mandate proceeded, there were sporadic manifestations of violent resistance, as in 1920, 1921 and 1929; but these were always confined to certain localities and focused on specific issues so that they could be optimistically viewed as specific incidents susceptible of specific remedies rather than as indications of a gathering insuperable opposition to the mandate. It was not until 1937, when the Palestinian Arabs finally rose up in arms throughout the country in an explicit revolt against British authority, that a Royal Commission of Inquiry came to the realization that the mandate was unworkable — that it could not be applied without constant and massive use of force against the Arabs. By then, however, the situation within Palestine had so changed that the idea of the Jewish National Home could no longer simply be abrogated. A point of no return had been reached.

When the British issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Jewish population of Palestine numbered some 56,000 against an Arab population of 600,000. In the course of the next 15 years, the Jews made important strides in organizing themselves for community self-government, creating a labor movement, pioneering new forms of settlement, establishing a Hebrew educational system, creating a national press and so on; but on the crucial issue of numbers, they had grown by only some 120,000 for a total of 175,000 by 1932 as against an Arab population which had grown naturally to 800,000.

Up to that point, the British could have probably reversed themselves on the Jewish National Home policy without undue concern about Jewish reaction. They did not choose to reverse themselves not because of a sinister imperialist interest in foisting a puppet Zionist state upon the Arabs, but because they saw no reason to retract a moral-legal obligation they had assumed when Arab resistance to it seemed relatively inconsequential.


Five years later, in 1937, the Arab revolt dissipated all illusions, but by then the British had lost most of their freedom to retreat because the capacity of the Jews to resist such a retreat had grown greatly. In the interim, Hitler's rise to power had induced a migration of German and Central European Jews to Palestine in hitherto unprecedented numbers, swelling the Jewish population in the country to 400,000 by 1937 and triggering an explosion of development in all spheres of Jewish national endeavor. A policy reversal then would have meant not only reneging on a moral-legal obligation at a moment when the rationale for it seemed greater than ever, but would also have required no less force to apply than was necessary to suppress the Arab revolt.

PARTITIONING PALESTINE

In short, from that moment on the Palestine problem ceased to be for the British primarily a matter of adjudication between rival moral-legal claims and became instead a political issue, a question of the art of the possible, in a situation in which two nationalist movements capable of offering strong armed resistance were bent on pursuing conflicting objectives. This is why the Royal Commission, after reaching the conclusion that the mandate was unworkable, did not simply go on to recommend its nullification but found it necessary to recommend the partition of the country into an Arab state, a Jewish state and a British enclave.

The course recommended by the Royal Commission in 1937 was to be recommended again ten years later by the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine for substantially identical reasons. In the interim, however, and as if to put these reasons to a test, the British government felt impelled by international circumstances on the eve of World War II to pursue a policy under which it dropped the partition proposal and tried in fact to reverse the Balfour Declaration.

As war with Germany appeared to be increasingly probable, the British government believed Arab goodwill to be crucial to the war effort in the Middle East and determined



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PARTITION OF PALESTINE

to gain it. Consequently, after attempting in vain in 1939 to achieve a settlement of the Palestine question by agreement in a special conference of Arabs and Jews, it issued a White Paper which practically reversed the Balfour Declaration. The White Paper did not go so far as to promise the liquidation of the Jewish establishment in Palestine, as the Arab leadership would have wished, but it froze it at its then existing level and envisaged the creation of an independent state of Palestine with an Arab majority after a ten-year transition period, if a constitution were adopted which guaranteed Jewish rights.

During the early years of World War II, Jewish resistance to the White Paper policy was confined to evading and violating its provisions restricting land purchase and immigration. But as the war receded from the Middle East, these efforts were supplemented

by terrorist attacks against British policy and military personnel and installations. After the war, as the British government continued to apply the White Paper policy while searching for possible alternatives, Jewish resistance grew more intense. At the same time, a universal wave of sympathy for the Jews released by knowledge of the Nazi holocaust lent support to Jewish resistance and exerted an enormous pressure on the British authorities to permit massive immigration of survivors of concentration camps immediately. The British tried to suppress the resistance and to play for time in order to attempt a solution of the Palestine question in the context of a broader settlement of their Middle Eastern problems. But after two years of vain efforts in both respects, they decided to pass the question to the United Nations.

The United Nations appointed a commission of 11 representatives of states with no interests in Palestine (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia) to inquire and make recommendations. The majority of the commission recommended partition while the minority advocated a federal state with autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces.

While the General Assembly debated these and other proposals, the representatives of the Arab countries and the Palestinian Arab leadership refused both recommendations and insisted once again on absolute Arab sovereignty over Palestine. This position left the delegations of most countries, who were unable to ignore the reality of the Jewish presence in Palestine, with no alternative but to opt for one of the two proposals of the commission; and since partition depended much less on Arab cooperation than federation, the statutory majority chose it in November, 1947.

Literally at the last moment, Arab representatives sought to forestall what had become an obvious majority for partition by coming out in support of the federal plan; but by then it was too late. Had the Arabs adopted this tactic earlier, it is almost certain that neither plan would have mustered the required two-thirds majority and the

whole matter would have been left open.

Their absolutist moral position having failed of recognition, the Palestinian Arabs now fell back on the only alternative such positions usually leave and, with the assistance of the neighboring Arab countries, resorted to arms to prevent partition. The fortunes of the civil war which began in December, 1947 were initially so favorable to the Palestinian Arabs that the United States government became convinced by March, 1948, that partition (for which it had voted and lobbied) was impracticable, and submitted to the General Assembly a proposal for a United Nations trusteeship over Palestine. However, while the United Nations became entangled in a discussion of trusteeship and how it could be enforced, the Jews of Palestine, having received a shipment of Russian arms and enjoying greater freedom of action as British withdrawal from the country continued, launched a series of offensives which reversed the tide of the war, decisively defeated the Palestinian Arabs, and brought most of the area allocated to them by the partition plan under their control.

On May 15, 1948, Palestine's Jews proclaimed the establishment of their state, Israel, which was immediately recognized by the United States, Soviet Russia and other nations. The Jews had barely time to celebrate; no sooner did they proclaim their state than armies of the neighboring Arab countries crossed the Palestine borders in another attempt to nullify the partition resolution by force. The Jewish-Arab conflict over Palestine thus became a war between the Arab states and Israel.

THE WAR OF 1948

The war of 1948 constitutes an indispensable subject of study for anyone wishing to understand the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict it inaugurated.

The first observation is that, Transjordan aside, the leaders, soldiers, politicians, writers, journalists, not to speak of the common people of the Arab countries, had had no contact with the Jewish community in Palestine and therefore had but a faint idea of its com-

position, organization, achievements, guiding ideals, aspirations and strength. The Arabs' almost total lack of nonbelligerent contact with the enemy's people and country and the Israelis' only slightly less sweeping lack of contact with the Arab states was to continue after the war and to provide what is probably a unique example of nations at war that have never known one another in peaceful commerce. This mutual ignorance accounts for much of the extreme fluctuations in their assessments of each other.

The near-success of the Palestinian Arabs, despite their primitive equipment, training and organization, in preventing the establishment of the Jewish state convinced the Arab governments that a small regular force could succeed in destroying Israel.

The woeful underestimation of the Jewish forces had its roots in the Arabs' static conception of Israeli troops. They thought of the Jewish forces at the time they decided to invade, in April, 1948, as constituting the total forces they would have to confront. Actually, because of the extraordinary cohesion and spirit of the Jewish community of Palestine and the foresight of its leaders (who had accumulated vast supplies of arms and equipment on ships in foreign ports ready to move as soon as British authority in Palestine ceased), these forces grew at a very rapid rate from one week to another. If the Arabs had a chance of winning the war, it was in its first few weeks, when the Israeli forces were not yet adequately organized and had not yet received and assimilated all the equipment they had accumulated. Once they missed this chance, the outcome was foreclosed.

The war involved a far-reaching modification of the United Nations partition plan. The Arab state envisaged by that plan failed to emerge and the territory allocated to it was divided among Israel, Jordan and Egypt according to the armistice agreements. Israel got the lion's share, some 2,500 square miles, which she formally annexed to the 5,600 square miles allotted to her by the partition plan. Transjordan acquired 2,200 square miles which she formally annexed, transforming herself into the state of Jordan, even be-

fore the conclusion of an armistice. Egypt retained control of the Gaza Strip, some 135 square miles, which she did not annex but held as Egyptian-controlled territory. As for Syria and Lebanon, the international frontiers of Palestine became the armistice lines between them and Israel. Jerusalem, intended by the partition plan to be under an international regime, was divided between Israel and Jordan. Several small, neutralized zones were created between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

The war involved also a major reshuffling of population. Over 700,000 Palestine Arabs who lived in the area that came under Israeli control were displaced in the course of the fighting both before and after May 15, 1948, and became refugees; in Jordan (about 60 per cent), the Gaza Strip (20 per cent) and Syria and Lebanon (20 per cent). The armistice agreements, while acknowledging the territorial changes, said nothing about the refugees; but a United Nations resolution of December 11, 1948 (before any armistice had been concluded) had ruled that those among them wishing to return and live at peace with their neighbors should be allowed to do so. A major controversy has continued since then on whether the refugees had left the territory under Jewish control of their own accord or had been compelled to leave by threat and force.



On the basis of first-hand observation it is clear that until early June, 1948, the refugees from areas under Jewish control left, and left in the face of persistent Jewish efforts to persuade them to stay. From that time on, they were expelled from almost all new territories that came under Israeli control. The number of refugees in each phase was approximately equal. The reason for this apparently odd behavior of Israelis and Arabs is simple. Until about the end of May, the Jews were not sure that they would be able to make the partition resolution stick in the face of anticipated and actual armed Arab hostility. They consequently had an interest in persuading the Arabs to remain in the territories under their control. This would have meant a de facto acceptance of partition on the part of

the Palestine Arabs and would have discouraged the Arab states from attacking or pursuing the war energetically with so many "hostages" in Israeli hands.

For exactly obverse reasons the Arab leaders, confident of the victory of the regular Arab armies, urged the Palestinian Arabs to leave what they considered temporarily Jewish-occupied territories. By the time of the first cease-fire, June 11, when it became clear that the Jewish state had survived the war, motivations were completely reversed. The Palestine Arabs, unwilling to leave their homes and properties with no hope of return, now wanted to stay while the Jews, having survived the Arab attempt to destroy their state, thought it advantageous to have a homogeneous population and proceeded to push the Arabs out.

A third and no less crucial result of the war was its crystallization of Arab disunity. The disunity was latent in the disparity of objectives sought by the various Arab countries. Transjordan, backed by Iraq, wanted to intervene militarily in order to secure the portions of Palestine allocated to the Arab state by the partition while Egypt, backed by Saudi Arabia, had sought to foil Transjordan's plan by nullifying partition altogether or securing as much territory as possible for a client Palestinian Arab state.

The differences, temporarily papered over, began to reappear as soon as the limits of the joint Arab military advance became apparent; then, Transjordan wanted to stop fighting and hold her gains while Egypt wanted to continue in the hope of achieving her objective. When the resumption of hostility led to losses for Transjordan, she definitely decided to sit by on the next round, leaving the Egyptian forces to be defeated and pushed out of the Negev. Finally, the quarrel broke into the open as Transjordan formally annexed the territory under her control while Egypt set up a Palestine Arab government in Gaza, claiming the entire country, and formally pulled out of the war by signing a separate armistice with Israel. This last act left the other Arab countries generally, and Jordan particularly, to face the Israelis alone in



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ISRAEL'S CHANGING BORDERS

working out armistice agreements under the implicit threat of resumption of a war they could only lose.

PEACE EFFORTS FAIL

Even before any armistice agreements had been concluded, the United Nations General Assembly had appointed a Conciliation Commission, composed of representatives of the United States, France and Turkey, and had charged it with assisting the parties concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding. The commission went to work before Israel and Syria signed the last armistice agreement, and invited representatives of Israel and the four neighboring countries for talks in Lausanne, where it acted as a mediator to bring about a peace agreement. After months of effort, on May 12, 1949, the commission succeeded in getting the Arabs and the Israelis to agree on an agenda and a basis for discussion, known since as the Lausanne Protocol. In this, both sides agreed to accept the United Nations partition resolution as a basis for discussing the boundaries question, after Israel had undertaken to take back 100,000 refugees as a goodwill gesture prior to any negotiation of the whole refugee question. But this was the limit of the commission's achievement; thereafter negotiations bogged down beyond retrieving, and the two sides tried to qualify away even the protocol itself.

Because the only open and formal peace attempt between Israel and its neighbors failed on account of the refugee and boundaries questions, most people concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict academically or diplomatically have come to view these two problems as the real issue. But these issues, in themselves, are not insoluble given either a shared desire for peace or the impossibility of avoiding it. The problem, however, has been that a desire for peace has been lacking on the part of key Arab countries, for reasons which have varied in the course of time, and that such have been the circumstances that these countries could not be compelled to make peace.

That the issues in themselves are not in-

tractable is evident not only from the obvious compromise suggested in the Lausanne Protocol but also from the more interesting attempt at peace between Israel and Jordan. As the Lausanne negotiations headed toward deadlock, Israeli representatives met with King Abdullah of Jordan and his advisers over a period of several months in the winter of 1949 and thrashed out the terms of a peace treaty between the two countries, including a settlement of the refugee and boundaries issues. The agreement was particularly significant since the majority of the refugees were located in Jordan and since the thorniest boundaries problems existed between the two countries. Nevertheless, a mutually acceptable settlement was broached because both sides could anticipate important gains—Israel's being obvious, and Jordan's involving the consolidation of its territorial annexation, the injection into the economy of large amounts of refugee compensation money, and acquisition of an outlet to the Mediterranean through free-port rights at Haifa.

The treaty did not come to fruition because the hostility of other Arab countries and opinion at home to peace deterred any Jordanian prime minister from putting his signature to the agreement and because King Abdullah was assassinated in July, 1951, for pursuing the attempt. The other Arab governments saw little to gain and much to lose by making peace.

On the side of gain, peace would offer the prospect of restoring land and rail communications between Egypt and the other Arab countries. But this benefit was of marginal importance since very little trade passed over these routes, then used mainly by tourists. Tourist movement could be easily diverted to sea and air routes. Another potential gain was the resettlement of at least some refugees. But on the humanitarian level, the urgency of this problem became greatly mitigated as international relief assumed the burden of supporting them.

Territorial concessions that might be won through peace appeared at that time to have little value to any country except perhaps Jordan, which was disposed to make peace

on other grounds anyway. The only real incentive for peace, and this a negative one, avoiding the burden of mounting defense expenditure, did not appear at the time as a real issue.

On the other hand, peace would have presented a number of material disadvantages from an Arab point of view. Lebanon would have had to share Beirut's transit trade with Haifa. Both Lebanon and Syria would have had to share with Israel (if not to lose to her, as they had to Palestine before the war) the benefits derived from providing passage to oil pipelines and sites for refineries. Israel, with her more advanced economic and technological infrastructure, would be likely to serve as regional base and headquarters for international business in the area, much of which would otherwise be forced to distribute itself in several Arab countries. Furthermore, an Israel at peace with her neighbors, using her nodal position as a means of bargaining for favorite status for her trade, was apt to prove a strong competitor for area markets which a country like Egypt, seeking to industrialize, needed for herself.

Far more important than these disadvantages, however, were the psychological, political and security liabilities of peace. The Arab countries went to war so confident in their military superiority that they expected their armies to become involved more in police-type operations than in serious warfare. The attitude of a country like Egypt was reflected in the very thin deployment of her troops from the Palestinian borders to Jerusalem, meant more to establish political claims than a real frontline. In these circumstances, defeat at the hands of the "Zionist gangs" was so humiliating that the Arabs simply refused to admit it. Though forced to sign armistice agreements which "objectively" recognized their failure, Arab leaders developed the rationalization that so long as they did not sign peace treaties, the game was not yet over.

This attitude of the Arab leaders was not only a device to protect their wounded dignity but was also for them a means of political and physical survival.

The consequences of acknowledging defeat were clear beyond mistaking. Egyptian Prime Minister Nugrashi pasha had been assassinated by a member of the fanatic Muslim Brethren organization for having accepted a cease-fire, before Egypt had even signed any armistice agreement. The entire Syrian regime, also, was overthrown by a military coup even before it had authorized any armistice. Prime Minister Riad al-Solh of Lebanon was assassinated for even less than seeking peace even though Lebanon had played a minor role. And King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated on suspicion that he wanted to make peace.

ARAB DISUNITY

Reinforcing internal pressures against peace were those deriving from the strange state of inter-Arab relations, relations ruled by a myth of Arab unity which, while not strong enough to make positive common action possible, was sufficiently strong to justify the leaders of the various Arab countries in interfering in each other's affairs.

The totally unexpected defeat of the Arab states resulted, in their eyes, not only in the loss of most of Palestine, but also in a crucial national security problem. This problem had an offensive as well as a defensive dimension, which fed on an ambivalent emotional evaluation of the Arab-Israeli situation. Given the ignorance of Israel among the Arab elites outside of Jordan, the shock of defeat tended to give birth to exaggerated notions about the capacity of the Israelis, their devilish cleverness, the international support they could command, the means they could muster and the ambitions they entertained.

Consequently, the Arab states, especially those immediately bordering on Israel, felt impelled to think of ways and means to protect themselves against possible future Israeli expansion. Jordan's monarch was inclined to protect his country by concluding peace with Israel and relying on his mutual defense treaty with Britain to deter Israel from breaking it in the future. Lebanon, too, might have chosen the path of peace and reliance on formal or informal international guarantees.

But Egypt and Syria, mistrusted informal international guarantees as much as they mistrusted the worth of a peace treaty with Israel and feared formal international guarantees even more than they feared Israel; therefore, they could only fall back on collective Arab security arrangements. These had the merit of being better served by abstention from making peace, for peace would legitimize Israel's entry into the Middle Eastern political arena; whereas by ostracizing her Israel could be prevented from aligning herself with some Arab states against others and a measure of caution could be imposed on outside powers. A condition for the successful application of this policy was, of course, that no Arab state should be allowed to make a separate peace with Israel. The line favored by Egypt and Syria had the further appeal of leaving open for the Arab countries the possibility of future offensive operations.

These impediments to peace found a convenient cover of legitimacy in Israel's refusal to abide by the United Nations resolution on the return of the refugees and, to a lesser extent, in her refusal to return to the partition boundaries. Israel could not meet these resolutions without jeopardizing her existence. Taking back the bulk of the refugees in addition to the Arabs already living in the country would have meant having an enormous minority with irredentist aspirations, and none knew better than the Israelis what this could mean, since they themselves had been such a minority in Palestine. As for the partition boundaries, these were totally indefensible, since they divided each of the two states envisaged by the resolution into three sections connected with each other by literally no more than points on the map. They had been adopted on the entirely unwarranted assumption that Arabs and Jews would accept them peacefully and cooperate with each other. Therefore, the Arab states needed only to insist on absolute compliance with United Nations resolutions on the refugees and the boundaries in order to avoid a peace they did not want or could not conclude; at the same time they could shift much of the blame to Israeli intransigence.

One issue that contributed to keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict festering was the more or less continual conflict on Israel's borders with various Arab states. The Arab governments collectively, and in varying degrees each singly, were constantly impelled to give to their peoples and to each other earhests of their ultimate offensive intentions in the form of miscellaneous acts of harrassment against Israel. And Israel, acting on the principle of caution, took the Arab leaders at their word, viewed all real or feigned harrassments as parts of a general scheme for her destruction and responded to them accordingly when possible.

Another issue that arose out of the persistence of the conflict and contributed in turn to exacerbating it was the dispute over the Jordan River waters. The sources of the river are found in Syria, Lebanon and Israel, and a major tributary flows into it from Jordan. The river itself flows in Israel and Jordan and its waters are indispensable for these two countries. In order to avoid conflict over the sharing of waters and to promote cooperation by indirect means, the United States sponsored a plan for the integrated exploitation of the river for the benefit of all riparian countries. After prolonged effort from 1953 to 1955, and some apparent progress, the whole project ran afoul political objections on the part of Syria, which sought to prevent Israel from reaping the large benefits accruing to her from the plan, even at the

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According to this observer the events of June, 1967, resulted in changed relations among the Arabs and the Israelis. Moreover, "The Soviet Union challenged the West and its interests in the area . . . Israel [did] accept the challenge [and] . . . prevented . . . a second Vietnam."

Soviet Posture in the Middle East

BY BENJAMIN SHWADRAN
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IN ORDER TO COMPREHEND the total impact of the Middle East crisis—its background, development, climax and consequences—two basic facts must be established. First, the recent history of Soviet policy in the Middle East is characterized by a pronounced pro-Arab position and outright hostility toward Israel.

But this Soviet hostility has always stopped short of a direct confrontation with the United States. Indeed, when the situation became perilous the Kremlin even cooperated with Washington behind the scenes to dampen the fires and reduce the danger lest it lead to a confrontation.

Second, in spite of concerted efforts on the part of the Americans, the Israelis and tacitly even the Russians to present the crisis as an Arab-Israeli clash, the crisis was and still is in reality a struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States for positions in the Middle East; in fact, the 1967 crisis was a Soviet challenge to United States influence and interest in the area, and a United States response to that challenge.

As the crisis unfolded it appeared that all the major protagonists in the drama—the Soviet leaders, the Arabs, the United States and even the Israelis—miscalculated.

¹ See United Nations records, *Documents S/PV-1342*, May 24, 1967, pp. 26-30, regarding the Soviet charge of Israeli mobilization. See also U Thant's report to the Security Council, U.N. records, *Documents S/7896*, May 19, 1967, for the U.N. observers' testimony.

The sudden increase in tension between Israel and the Arab states, especially Egypt, in the early part of May, 1967, was directly traceable to Moscow. Syria had been the most aggressive of Israel's neighbors, not only threatening her existence but actually engaging in acts of terror and sabotage on Israeli territory especially through the *al Fatah* organization. Through her ambassador in Tel Aviv, Russia charged in May that Israel had mobilized her forces along her northeastern border and was about to invade Syria. Israel denied the charge and invited the Soviet ambassador to visit the Israeli-Syrian border area and convince himself, but he refused. When the United Nations observers on the spot reported no mobilization, Moscow still persisted.¹ Why?

Although the Soviet mainstay in the Middle East was and is Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his "progressive socialist" United Arab Republic, the U.S.S.R. was not too happy with the Arab leader. Nasser himself was not a Communist, and Communist activity was not permitted in Egypt. Moreover, Nasser's very costly adventures in Yemen were a failure, and his leadership in the Arab world had been seriously impaired, especially by his inability to take over the Arabian Peninsula and gain control of Middle East oil. Moreover, the Islamic alliance of monarchical reactionary states in the area, headed by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, remained a grave challenge to the "progressive socialist" Arabs.

Syria, on the other hand, although not so stable as Egypt, had traveled much further than Nasser towards communism. Because the leftist Baathists controlled the government, Moscow saw hopeful prospects in Syria. Unlike Egypt (where the ties with the Soviet Union were only governmental) Syria and the U.S.S.R. maintained close ties between their political parties.

The Syrians and the Egyptians, however, were at loggerheads and were not even talking to one another; the former constantly taunted the latter of failing in their duty toward the liberation of Arab Palestine from the Israelis by hiding behind the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was stationed along the border between Israel and Sinai, in Sharm-al-Sheikh on the Strait of Tiran and the Gaza Strip.

In this situation, the Soviet Union worked methodically to bring Syria and Egypt together and to pull Nasser toward the more radical position of the Syrian leftists. In November, 1966, the Soviet leaders succeeded in arranging a meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Cairo. The upshot was an agreement to resume diplomatic relations and a treaty for joint defense; the treaty provided that if one of the parties became the victim of aggression the other would immediately use all means at its disposal, including its armed forces, to repulse the aggressor.

Therefore, when the Soviet Union charged in May that Syria was about to be invaded—as Nasser himself later related—Nasser had no alternative but to come to Syria's aid. In order to act he had to overcome the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force, and he asked the United Nations on May 18 for its removal. At the same time, Egyptian forces were massing in Sinai.

SOVIET MISCALCULATIONS

It was no doubt with the blessing if not with the urging of the Soviet Union that Egypt asked the Secretary General for the removal of UNEF. It is to be recalled that the Soviet Union had not favored the force,

had refused to help pay for it, and was opposed to granting executive powers to United Nations agencies. It is possible that the Soviet Union did not expect so quick a response from U Thant and that developments moved more rapidly than it anticipated. The removal of the force, however, automatically returned the Sharm-al-Sheikh area to Egyptian control. This could only mean that President Nasser would blockade the strait.

The view that the Soviet Union did not intend Egypt to close the strait and did not approve the blockade is not borne out by the basic facts. Indeed, a Moscow commentator wrote on June 2 that the blockade was necessary and that "the United Arab Republic emphasizes that it is merely reestablishing the position existing prior to 1956, that is, before the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt."² Therein lies the key to Soviet objectives.

The Kremlin planners not only expected Nasser to blockade the Strait of Tiran but were almost certain that the United States would prevail over Israel to accept the blockade. For the Russians, it was inconceivable that the United States, deeply involved in Vietnam, would plunge into a second far-away foreign war and, because of the proximity to the Soviet Union, risk an atomic conflagration. Israel would have to listen to the logic of the situation; there was too much at stake for a small insignificant strait.

If Soviet plans had succeeded, Nasser's prestige would have risen; he would have removed the United Nations Emergency Force; he would have saved Syria (for Israel would have been reported as having withdrawn her forces from the Syrian border for fear of Egypt); he would have humbled Israel by the blockade of the strait. All this would have been accomplished with Soviet support and without firing a single shot.

Indeed, after Nasser proclaimed the blockade of the Strait of Tiran and after the United Nations Security Council was urgently convened on May 24 at the request of Canada and Denmark to deal with the dangerously explosive situation, the Soviet delegate, Nikolai Federenko, declared:

² *The New Times* (Moscow edition), June 2, 1967, p. 1.

The Soviet delegation . . . deems it necessary to stress that it does not see sufficient grounds for a hasty convening of the Security Council and the artificially dramatic climate fostered by the representatives of some Western Powers, which are probably counting on an exaggerated effort in the staging of this meeting. . . . Is there not here more of a concealed desire to interfere in the affairs of someone else, rather than a true concern for the peace and security of the Near East?

The Soviet satellite in the Security Council, the representative of Bulgaria, dutifully echoed his master's voice by stating that his delegation believed "that at the present moment there is really no need for an urgent meeting of the Security Council." These Soviet assertions were made in face of U Thant's statement five days earlier, on May 19, that "the current situation in the Near East is more disturbing, indeed I may say more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956."

It is obvious that at this stage of the crisis the Soviet Union was bent on not permitting the United Nations to interfere with the development of events which, it believed, would favor Nasser. It was convinced that the United States would succeed in persuading the Israelis to accept the closing of the strait. It doubted that the Israelis would dare enter hostilities with the Arab states without British and American aid, especially in view of the Soviet warning of May 23:

But let no one have any doubts about the fact that, should anyone try to unleash aggression in the Near East, he would be met not only with the united strength of Arab countries [Soviet arms] but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving states."

Yet the United States either failed or did not try hard enough to persuade the Israelis; on their part, the Israelis saw in the closing of the Strait of Tiran an act of war, and dared alone and in the face of Soviet threats to enter into open hostilities with their Arab enemies. Shortly thereafter, they achieved very impressive victories in the territories of the Arabs. The first stage of the Soviet strategy failed. But was the adventure a com-

plete disaster? Not at all. The Israelis must be made to pay for their defiant acts.

UNITED NATIONS ARENA

The second stage in Soviet tactics, once the war broke out and the Israelis had swept through Sinai and the west bank of Jordan, was to bring about a repetition of 1956 United Nations action, and convert a military defeat into a diplomatic victory. This time, they hoped that the task would be even easier. Britain was not involved; France was on the other side of the fence; in its anxiety to avoid a confrontation in the Middle East, the United States would follow the same path as it did in 1956; and a far larger number of Asian and African member states would support demands for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Indeed, unlike 1956, the action against Israel could be accomplished in the Security Council. Should Israel be made to withdraw unconditionally to her frontiers of June 4, Nasser could still emerge victorious to the greater glory of the Soviet Union.

However, the United States and other members of the Security Council refused to follow the 1956 line; instead of a demand for unconditional withdrawal, the United States sought first a cease-fire. The Soviet delegate became violent and attacked, abused and threatened Israel; he charged the United States and Great Britain with complicity with Israel. But to no avail. The United States and other members of the Council persisted in pressing for a cease-fire order.

The Soviet Union became alarmed: its refusal to agree to a cease-fire might bring a confrontation in the Middle East which must be avoided; an acceptance of the cease-fire order without an unconditional withdrawal would mean not only a disastrous defeat for the Arabs but also a serious loss of Soviet prestige in the Middle East. The choice had to be made. The "hot" line between Moscow and Washington was activated and a unanimous cease-fire resolution was introduced in the Security Council.

Soviet consent to the cease-fire was a great shock to the Arabs, and at first Egypt refused to accept it. But later, doubtless under the

impact of military realities, President Nasser consented to the Security Council order.

It served both the Arabs and the Soviet Union to ascribe the Israeli military victories to direct as well as indirect help from the imperialists: Great Britain and, especially, the United States. On June 5, the Soviet government issued a statement charging that Israeli adventurism in the Middle East "was encouraged by covert and overt action of certain imperialist circles." The Arab states thereupon broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the United States.

Israel's determination to obey the Security Council cease-fire order only after the other side fully agreed to do the same angered the Soviet authorities to the point of angry vituperation.

On June 10, Israel's ambassador in Moscow was handed a statement that threatened Israel if she did not stop military activities in Syria. It also informed him that the Soviet Union had broken off diplomatic relations with his country.³

In the Security Council, Nikolai Federenko added a new threat, saying that if the Council did not stop Israel immediately "an extremely serious situation" would result; "all the responsibility for it will lie with those who impede the adoption of the necessary decision by the Security Council." After the Soviets agreed to grant executive powers to the representatives of the Secretary General to supervise the cease-fire, a resolution was unanimously adopted and the order went into effect on June 11.

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

In the meantime, both the United States and the Soviet Union had introduced draft resolutions. The United States insisted that the ultimate solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict must be the establishment of a stable and durable peace; since the basic issue was the Arab refusal to recognize the existence of Israel, a return to the status quo before June 5 would solve nothing and would pose the

very dangers which had brought on the war. The solution therefore must be based on a discussion among the parties, who could use third party or United Nations assistance as they might choose. The Soviet Union insisted relentlessly on a condemnation of Israel and on an unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces behind the armistice lines. On June 14 the Security Council refused to adopt the Soviet draft resolution.

The Kremlin planners were frustrated and defeated, but they were not ready to give up. They still hoped to put pressure both on Israel and on the United States by turning to the General Assembly.

The Soviet attempt in the General Assembly revealed the same dichotomy. Publicly, from the rostrum of the United Nations, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Aleksei Kosygin, castigated Israel in the strongest terms, and called for her condemnation and for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice lines. He added a new demand, that without any delay, Israel pay full war reparations to the Arabs. Like his Soviet colleagues in the Security Council, Kosygin directly accused "certain imperialist circles" of supporting and inciting Israel. Yet privately, the Glassboro spirit, whatever else it represented, aimed at avoiding a direct confrontation, and strove to create an atmosphere of eased tensions between the two great world powers.

The Soviet Union's efforts in the General Assembly were no more successful than they were in the Security Council; in reality there was an indirect confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. It soon became clear that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could muster a two-thirds vote of support for its resolution in the Assembly; the struggle shifted therefore to two other resolutions. A noncommitted group of member states headed by Yugoslavia merely asked for the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the lines established by the armistice agreements; a group of Latin American states called on Israel to withdraw her forces from all the territories of Jordan,

³ On June 13, all Soviet bloc countries except Rumania and including Yugoslavia broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.

Syria and the United Arab Republic, but tied the withdrawal to a request of all parties in the conflict to end the state of belligerency. The Soviet Union favored the Yugoslav resolution while the United States openly supported the Latin American draft.

It would seem that Soviet policy almost stumbled in the last minutes before the vote. Apparently anxious to salvage some measure of achievement from the Assembly's emergency session and eager to reach some solution with the United States behind the scenes, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reportedly worked out with United States delegate Arthur Goldberg a compromise draft resolution based on the Latin American proposal, and he attempted to persuade the Arab delegations to agree to it. However, the reaction of some of the Arab delegations, especially the "progressive" Algerians and Syrians, was so violent that Gromyko dropped the proposal, and reverted to support of the Yugoslav draft. On July 4, the Assembly voted. The United States withdrew its draft. The Soviet Union resolution as well as the Yugoslav and Latin American drafts failed to pass.⁴ The Soviet Union was again defeated.

ARAB MISCALCULATIONS

While generally unanimous in their opposition to Israel, each of her Arab neighbors assumed a different position as to the nature of that opposition. The most extreme stance was taken by Syria, who not only constantly harassed Israel with acts of terror and sabotage and openly demanded her elimination but actively fostered the *al Fatah* movement whose sole aim was the elimination of Israel. Syria also sponsored plans and operations which would have denied Israel the Upper Jordan River sources. In addition, Syria repeatedly and tauntingly challenged President Nasser to come out from behind the skirts of the United Nations Emergency Force and do his duty to the cause of Arab Palestine. Leb-

anon, on the other hand, was the quietest of Israel's neighbors; the composition of her population and the nature of her military strength and of her borders with Israel made it very prudent for Lebanon to keep her silence. Jordan stood to lose everything from a military conflict with Israel; thus King Hussein adroitly maintained a proper anti-Israeli stance, yet resisted the pressures of Syria, of the United Arab Republic, of the *al Fatah* and other elements and movements of former Palestinians working for the restoration of Palestine.

Though very vociferous in his condemnations of Israel and most extravagant in his threats, President Nasser was very cautious about military involvement with Israel especially after his experiences in the 1948 war and the 1956 disaster. Because of his preoccupation in Yemen and his struggle for Arab leadership, Nasser was doubtless satisfied with the presence of UNEF along the Egyptian-Israeli border and along the Gaza Strip. However, after the Soviet leaders convinced him that Syria was actually in danger of being invaded by Israel, Nasser was forced to come to Syria's aid as a matter of Arab leadership.

Like his Moscow mentors, the President of Egypt did not expect war. He counted on the efforts of the United States and on the threats of the Soviet Union to dissuade Israel from resisting and believed she would humiliatingly accept the conditions as they existed prior to 1956.

Unfortunately for Nasser, Israel was not ready either to be intimidated or to be persuaded to accept the closure of the strait; nor was the United States ready to pressure Israel to accept the closure. Moreover, although it extended economic and military aid to Egypt and even encouraged Nasser in his steps against Israel, the Soviet Union was far from ready to join the Arabs in battle.

The Arab world was rapidly engulfed in a war hysteria in which even Jordan's cautious King Hussein became involved. On May 30, the King flew into Cairo and signed a military pact with Nasser. When Hussein returned to Amman, Ahmad Shukairy, the

⁴ The vote count was: Soviet Union resolution—45 for, 48 against, and 22 abstentions; Yugoslav resolution—53 for, 46 against and 20 abstentions; Latin American resolution—57 for, 43 against and 20 abstentions.

sworn enemy of the King and leader of the *al Fatah* movement, accompanied him as his aide; previously he had not been permitted to enter Jordan. By the end of May, the U.A.R. seems to have reluctantly and fatalistically resigned itself to the inevitability of war. It would be very difficult to establish whether Nasser was so ignorant of the real strength and high-level organization of the Israeli forces and the weak position and poor organization of his own military forces that he spoke with confidence of a decisive and rapid victory only two days before the war broke out; or whether Nasser knew the real situation but was carried away by the emotional war hysteria that engulfed Egypt and the entire Arab world.

Alas, all his hopes were dashed. The Israelis resisted and successfully achieved all their objectives; the United States did not dissuade Israel from resisting and did not demand Israeli withdrawal; finally, the Soviet Union did not join in battle. Although Nasser explained the Israeli victory by charging direct American and British help, his prestige in the Arab world was seriously damaged.

U. S. MISCALCULATIONS

The United States was anxious, if not determined, to do everything in its power to avoid open hostilities in the Middle East. But in view of the Soviet challenge to the West in the area, and in view of the State Department policy of not antagonizing either side in the conflict, was it possible to stir a safe course? The Johnson Administration thought so; it tried, and failed. As the situation grew tense, the State Department asked the Israeli government (on May 22) not to take any unilateral action for two or three days until the United States could develop a plan for keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open.

On the following day, President Lyndon Johnson made his first important policy statement, reflecting a new approach to the problem if not a new policy. The President pointed to three explosive elements in the situation: the ineffectiveness of the armistice agreements; the hurried withdrawal of the

United Nations Emergency Force without action of the General Assembly or Security Council; and the build-up of military forces, especially in sensitive areas like the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba. The President stated the United States position unequivocally: (1) the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway and the blockade of Israeli shipping was illegal; free and innocent passage through the gulf was vital to the international community; (2) the United States was firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area; (3) the United States opposed all forms of aggression, overt or clandestine.

But the President did not make clear how these far-reaching pronouncements could or would be enforced. He no doubt thought that the very pronouncements and the diplomatic efforts on the spot by both United States and United Nations representatives would dissuade President Nasser from closing the Strait of Tiran or taking any other precipitate action. Yet on the very day that the President made his statement, and before the United Nations Secretary General arrived in Cairo, Nasser proclaimed the blockade of the strait.

The first United States diplomatic shot failed; and Washington realized that international participation would be necessary. The United States approached the British, the Scandinavians, the Italians, the French, and other maritime powers, appealing for concerted action to break the blockade. But even while Washington was talking of Operation Regatta, a campaign to assemble an international flotilla to force its way through

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Discussing the role played by the United States in the recent Arab-Israeli crisis, this specialist suggests that "The United States, rightly or wrongly, gave the impression of identifying [its] interest with that of Israel . . ." and in so doing may have endangered other interests it has in the Middle East.

The U. S. in the 1967 Middle East Crisis

By HARRY N. HOWARD

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THE VARIED INTERESTS of the United States in the Middle East date from the early nineteenth century. In view of the dramatic events of the spring and summer of 1967, it is worthwhile to recall them in historical sequence. First, American-missionary-educational-philanthropic enterprises began about 1819, and culminated in the establishment of influential educational institutions like Robert College (1863), the American universities of Beirut (1866) and Cairo (1920) and other schools. Second, after World War II, commercial-economic interests burgeoned. Third, politico-strategic interests may be dated, almost precisely, from December 3, 1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in extending lend-lease assistance to Turkey, declared the defense of that country "vital to the defense of the United States," and subsequently extended that principle to the Middle East as a whole.

In the period since World War II, all these interests have persisted, with special stress on politico-strategic and economic interests. As British power receded, the United States came to the defense of the Turkish Republic, against a Soviet threat, during 1945-1947, when the Sixth Fleet came into being; President Harry S Truman enunciated the doctrine that bears his name on March 12, 1947,

in behalf of Greece and Turkey. Subsequently, the United States took a very direct interest in the problem of the Turkish Straits and played a dominant role, indeed, in the events which led to the partition of Palestine and to the establishment of the state of Israel (1947-1948). During 1950-1951 it initiated moves that eventuated in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, the only basic commitment relative to peace, security and stability in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During 1951-1952, it sought to construct a Middle East command or defense organization, together with France, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as a defense against possible Soviet infiltration into the area.

Following the failure of earlier proposals, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles postulated his "northern tier" concept as a make-weight against the U.S.S.R. By 1955, the tier concept had resulted in the Baghdad Pact, later known as CENTO. Greece and Turkey (through NATO, in 1952) and Iran (through CENTO, in 1959) became allies of the United States, and in March, 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was enunciated. Because of its growing politico-strategic interest, the United States became involved, along with other powers, in the Palestine, Cyprus and Yemeni questions, and was much concerned

about the weakening British position in Aden. Many minor Middle East issues also came to the American doorstep.

Granted the geopolitical significance of the Middle East, at the Eurasian-African cross-roads, along which are strewn the "wells of power," the American interest was both natural and real. With some 300 billion barrels of oil in proved reserves, the Middle East remains the world's largest petroleum reservoir, and daily production totals some 9 million barrels, of which West Europe takes some 5,600,000, (or 65 per cent of its requirements) and Japan takes 1,200,000 (60 per cent of her requirements). About 52 per cent of European requirements ordinarily pass through the Suez Canal, closure of which now costs West Europe an estimated \$250 million monthly. Although the United States has supplies closer to home, both West Europe and Japan might well be blackmailed politically and economically if the U.S.S.R. should dominate the Middle East. Moreover, private American investment in the area, overwhelmingly centered in oil exploitation, now totals more than \$3 billion. It may be observed that American public investment in technical and economic assistance has reached \$8 billion, to say nothing of military assistance, which might well bring the figure of public investment to some \$15 billion or even \$20 billion.

Despite the manifold and complex structure of the American interest in the Middle East, extending from Iran to the Gates of Hercules, American policy during 1967 appeared publicly polarized in almost complete support of Israel. This polarization was undoubtedly facilitated by developments in the Arab world, especially by the policies of Syria and the United Arab Republic, which appeared increasingly oriented toward the Soviet Union. The Arab image of the United States as the stronghold of world Zionism, and the American image of the Arab world, with its rising tide of nationalism, as a stronghold of communism, also facilitated polarization.

With rising tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the spring of 1967, and the out-

break of hostilities on June 5, the positions of the United States, West Europe and the U.S.S.R. seemed fairly well set. While the United States and the U.S.S.R. were cautious as to open confrontation, they were clearly lined up on opposite sides. As the situation became very grave during April and May, particularly between Syria and the U.A.R., on the one hand, and Israel on the other, conflict appeared inevitable. On May 17, the U.A.R. requested the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from both Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Israel mobilized quietly, and the U.A.R. mobilized with much fanfare, under the banner of Arab solidarity, and then closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping on May 22, an act of war in Israeli eyes.

President Lyndon B. Johnson considered the U.A.R. move "the single act of folly" more responsible than any other act for the later explosion. On May 23, he declared the right of innocent passage into the Gulf of Aqaba "a vital interest of the entire free international community," although he was unable to persuade other interested states to implement the principle. At the same time, the President noted three "potentially explosive aspects" of the confrontation: 1) the failure of the General Armistice Agreements (1949) to prevent warlike acts; 2) the hasty withdrawal of UNEF, at which he was dismayed; and 3) the buildup of military forces in the area. In consonance with the policies of Presidents Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy, President Johnson observed that the United States was opposed to aggression, had sought good relations with all states in the Middle East, and was "committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area."

United States delegate to the U.N. Arthur Goldberg repeated the President's words in the Security Council on May 24, and added that the United States was prepared, both within and outside the United Nations, to join with the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and France "in a common effort to restore and maintain peace in the Near East."

French President Charles de Gaulle, in fact, had made a similar proposal, but probably because of the polarization of international politics in the area, it never formally materialized, although British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (who substantially supported the American position) journeyed to Washington on June 2.

As events moved rapidly and almost ineluctably toward open hostilities, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban conferred with President Johnson on May 26, following talks in Paris and London, and indicated that Israel was prepared to "go it alone." At the same time, there were assertions that the United States was committed to the defense of free navigation in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, no doubt on the basis of the Dulles memorandum of February 11, 1957, after the 1956 Suez conflict. The U.S.S.R., now moving additional warships through the Turkish Straits into the eastern Mediterranean, was said to support the U.A.R.

U.N. Secretary General U Thant then called for a breathing spell, and the United States, on May 31, introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council endorsing this appeal, to gain time to work out a possible solution. But time was now clearly running out; on May 30, Jordan signed a defense pact with the U.A.R., already allied with Syria, placing her army under U.A.R. command and Israel's sense of vulnerability was intensified. Whatever U.A.R. intentions were at this late hour, it may be observed that on June 4 it was announced that U.A.R. Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin and Deputy Prime Minister Mahmud Fawzi were to confer with President Johnson on June 7.

When the *blitzkrieg* came on June 5, President Johnson was "deeply distressed" that large-scale fighting had broken out, as was the British government, and President de Gaulle denounced the Israeli "aggression." A Department of State spokesman initially announced American neutrality in "thought, word and deed" but because of obvious

American sympathies, the statement was soon revised. In view of the overwhelming and instantaneous success of the Israeli air strike, there were immediate U.A.R. charges of Anglo-American participation in the attack—charges which were categorically denied at once. The Security Council voted a cease-fire on June 6, but it was not immediately implemented and there were further resolutions on June 7 and 9. As the deliberations continued, additional resolutions were adopted on June 12 and 14 condemning violations, calling for full cooperation with the UNTSO¹ and asking Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military action had taken place and "to facilitate the return of those inhabitants" who had "fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities."

ASSEMBLY ACTION

The Security Council was, however, unable to meet its basic responsibilities and the problem was remanded to a special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, a move opposed by the United States, along with Botswana and Israel. As the General Assembly opened on June 19, President Johnson laid down the five basic principles for peace in the Middle East which now constitute the position of the United States: 1) the recognized right to national life; 2) justice for the Arab refugees; 3) innocent maritime passage; 4) limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and 5) political independence and territorial integrity. Ambassador Goldberg embodied them in a draft resolution in the General Assembly the next day.

There was, of course, much to commend this position; granted their implementation, these principles appeared to offer some prospect for more orderly development in the Middle East. This might have been the case, particularly if American policy had not seemed so definitely to favor Israel at the time, as Soviet policy favored the Arabs, with full Soviet support for the U.A.R. and Syria particularly outlined in the General Assembly address of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin on June 19. The British position, outlined by

¹ United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

Foreign Secretary George Brown on June 21, substantially resembled that of the United States, although there was a basic difference of style and a clear application of principle which the United States did not approach. Brown said precisely what he meant by the principle of support for "political independence and territorial integrity," which had "a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal" of Israeli forces from occupied areas. There were "no two ways" about withdrawal, according to Brown, since it followed "from the words in the Charter that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement." In view of the Israeli occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem, he called on Israel to take no steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle, and he warned that if Israel took steps purporting to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, she would risk isolation from world opinion and loss of support. The French position, expounded on June 22 by Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, was different; it was closely associated both with the recovery of France's influence in the Arab world (despite her supply of military aircraft to Israel) and with French disagreement with the United States over Vietnam. Moreover, the French government was not sanguine about the prospects of peace in the light of the humiliation and the frustrations following the Arab setback.

The United States, which foresaw a serious increase in the Arab refugee problem in the wake of the *blitzkrieg*, and set aside \$5 million for possible emergency aid, also indicated that it was not completely identified with Israeli policy in the annexation of Jerusalem. When Israel announced the "unification" of Jerusalem on June 28, the White House immediately declared that President Johnson assumed that "before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are concerned." The Department of State declared that the Israeli action could not "be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them," and recalled

that the United States had "never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem." Ambassador Goldberg repeated this position on July 3 and 14.

UNITED STATES ABSTENTION

Nevertheless, the United States abstained on the resolution of July 14, calling on Israel to "rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem" and requesting the Secretary General to report on the situation and on the implementation of the resolution. While the resolution was approved (100-18), it did not fully correspond to American views, especially because it appeared to regard Israeli administrative measures in Jerusalem as constituting annexation, and because the United States did not believe that the problem of Jerusalem, realistically, could be solved apart from other aspects of the Middle East situation. Meanwhile, neither the Soviet draft resolution, which condemned Israeli "aggression" and called for indemnities, and the American draft resolution, based on the five principles of President Johnson, had any chance of adoption. Neither did a Latin American modification of the American proposal. At the last, there appeared to be some possibility of a Soviet-American adjustment, calling for troop withdrawal, acknowledging the right of every United Nations member to maintain an independent national state of its own, and renouncing all claims and acts inconsistent with this principle. But the Arab states found this unacceptable. The General Assembly adjourned without further action.

INTRASIGENCE

When the General Assembly reconvened in regular session in September, the situation in

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As this observer sees the situation, ". . . there can be no permanent peace in the Middle East until the Arab nations agree to negotiate directly with Israel, sign a peace treaty, and exchange diplomatic relations."

Israel After Victory

By DWIGHT JAMES SIMPSON
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THE STRUCTURE of politics in the Middle East has been shattered. It is unlikely that it will ever be rebuilt along the lines existing before the lightning Israeli victory over the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. This is the main lesson of the recently ended "third round" of the Arab-Israeli war. Consequently, all the familiar explanations of the historic Arab-Israeli controversy—whether relating to boundaries, refugees, diplomacy or warfare—now need revision. The world, and particularly the inhabitants of the Middle East itself—Israeli and Arab alike—will have to shift mental gears and consider the essentially new facts that pose unfamiliar problems. The key to politics in the "new" Middle East lies in the way the inhabitants of the area adjust to these new facts.

Our appraisal must begin with the military events. In six days the Israeli military forces, numbering approximately 270,000 regulars and reservists, utterly smashed the combined forces of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. In a brilliantly coordinated use of air power and highly mobile armored units, especially on the Sinai front facing the Egyptians, Israel's combined forces under the leadership of Chief of Staff Major General Itzhak Rabin destroyed much of the enemy's air force, encircled and captured entire enemy brigades and divisions with their equipment intact and even overran and captured a large Russian-constructed-and-supplied rocket-

launching base within a few miles of the Suez Canal.

Most foreign, especially Western, military observers had anticipated that in the event of a "third round" of the Arab-Israeli war the Israelis would triumph. But no one had predicted or even hinted at the speed and sweeping nature of the Israeli victory. Even more startling was the fact that the Soviet Union, the main supplier of arms to the Arab forces, was the victim of its own incredibly bad intelligence estimates and calculations. Moreover, knowing that Russian military training missions have been in Syria and Egypt for the past ten years, Arab observers may well want to raise serious questions about the competence of such missions and their value to the recipient country.

The main explanation for the stunning Israeli victory lies in the social and cultural disparities of the adversaries. After their earlier triumph in the Suez campaign of 1956, the Israelis vigorously supplied, organized and trained their armed forces until they achieved a finely-honed military weapon capable of cutting the Arab armies to ribbons. The dedication and competence of the Israeli military leaders, including General Rabin, General Moshe Dayan, the minister of defense, General Mordecai Gor of the air force, Brigadier General Shmuel Eyal, an outstanding general staff officer, and many others, are unquestioned. Equally remarkable is the comparative youth of the senior Israeli mili-

tary leadership; Dayan is the oldest at 52, Rabin is only 45.

The officer corps in the Arab armies suffers by comparison. In Egypt, for instance, despite President Gamal Abdel Nasser's efforts at reform, an officer's commission is still often regarded as a position of privilege rather than one of responsibility. Perquisite seeking and self-enrichment rather than military effectiveness are characteristic of many Arab officers, with the dual result that the officer corps itself is incompetent and the training and morale of the troops are wholly inadequate.

Moreover, Israel is a relatively modern, one-class state with a basically "European" outlook and orientation, whereas the Arab countries, despite superficial appearances and years of propaganda rhetoric to the contrary, are antiquated societies with rigid class structures whose populations are still basically illiterate and backward. Additionally, the Israelis have precisely what the Arabs mostly lack: self-discipline, enthusiasm for hard work and a great will to fight.

The most decisive result of the war has been to shift the balance of power in the Middle East overwhelmingly in Israel's favor. Consequently, for as far into the future as one can see, unless there is direct great power intervention (which seems most unlikely), Israel will have unquestioned military superiority in the area. After only 20 years of statehood she has become the strongest single power in the Middle East—except for Turkey—and now possesses a strength that clearly outbalances all the Arab states combined. This shift in the balance of power, as well as the psychological and political impact of the Israeli victories, are certain to influence not only Arab-Israeli relations but relations among Arab states themselves. In light of the new facts of power in the Middle East, it seems clear that the Arab leadership that has counseled moderation and compromise—President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia is an outstanding example—will find that its arguments are far more persuasive than formerly.

Another crucial result of the war is the question of captured territories. On the Syrian front, the Israelis now occupy the

Golan Heights, a 400-square-mile area east of the Sea of Galilee. For the past decade, Syrian gun emplacements in the region were used to shell Israeli villages and farms along the sea, and Syrian infiltrators and saboteurs used the region as a main staging base. Most of the so-called border incidents of recent years have taken place there. As long as the Israelis maintain their occupation of the Golan Heights, they can guarantee relative stability and peace on the formerly troubled Syrian frontier. Additionally, except for the small tributary that rises in Lebanon, the Golan Heights contain the headwaters of the Jordan River. In past years there have been repeated Syrian threats to divert an important part of the Jordan's flow to deprive the Israeli agricultural economy of its use. Continued Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights not only removes this threat but also makes possible unchallenged Israeli control and future utilization of the vital Jordan River water.

Second, the Israelis have occupied the entire Jordanian west-bank territory. Approximately one-third the size of pre-war Israel, this region is mostly farmland and contains several small Arab cities, including Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem. In contrast to the Syrian territory of the Golan Heights, which was practically deserted by its Arab inhabitants, the west bank still contains approximately 700,000 Jordanians who are now under Israeli occupation. From the Israeli viewpoint, however, the greatest prize resulting from occupation of the west bank is the return to Jewish control, for the first time in nearly 2,000 years, of the Old City of Jerusalem and the sacred Wailing Wall. Immediately on their capture of the Old City, the Israelis announced they were in Jerusalem to stay and that the city, in their words, was "not negotiable." To underscore this, Israeli authorities have set in motion several programs aimed at a physical and administrative incorporation of the Old City into the sector of Jerusalem previously controlled by Israel. These far-reaching steps have been taken despite the Vatican's public declaration favoring some form of inter-

nationalized status for Jerusalem and the United Nations Security Council resolution calling on Israel to refrain from any unification of Jerusalem under Israeli political control.

Third, the Israelis have occupied the physically small but strategically important Gaza Strip, once the source of deadly infiltration and since 1956 the source of a threat of armed incursion. The Gaza Strip had been administered by Egyptian authorities and is the site of refugee camps containing 300,000 Arab refugees, all of whom are now under Israeli control.

Fourth, by occupying the entire 20,000-square-mile Sinai Peninsula—which is practically uninhabited—the Israelis have immeasurably improved their strategic position vis-à-vis Egypt. Israeli forces occupying the Sharm-al-Sheikh sector of Sinai on the Red Sea now control the entrance to the hotly disputed Gulf of Aqaba and are in a position to guarantee unrestricted Israeli passage through the Strait of Tiran to their increasingly important port of Elath. Additionally, by occupying the east bank of the Suez Canal, Israel is now in a superior position to gain for her shipping free access to the Canal, a goal that has eluded her for 20 years. And finally, mere occupation of the Sinai Peninsula removes from Egyptian hands the only possible staging area for an Egyptian land attack on Israel's southern flank.

In brief form, the above are the crucial Middle East facts at the end of 1967. Consequently, the overriding question in Israel today is the question that will surely dominate her political life in the days ahead: How will the Arab states adjust to these facts? From the Arab viewpoint, whether of "progressive" persuasion (Algeria's President Houari Boumediene or Syria's President Nurredin al-Attassi) or "conservative" (Saudi Arabia's King Faisal or Jordan's King Hussein), the immediate consequences of the war are nearly catastrophic. For the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian governments merely to recreate the military status quo as it existed on the eve of the war would require from two to five years of planning and training and a re-

equipment program (using Russian or Chinese arms) costing an estimated \$2 billion. To say the least, it is highly dubious that such a goal can be achieved. And even if it were achieved, the Arabs would only have created a military force which the Israelis could almost surely destroy again at will.

ARAB ALTERNATIVES

Always hard-pressed even before the war, Jordan and Egypt will doubtless suffer much from their territorial losses and the attendant economic consequences. In the opinion of many observers, Jordan, which lost half her territory, has become an economically unviable country. To put it bluntly, Jordan appears to face alternatives, in descending order: recovery of her west bank so that her existence as a state may continue; taking her place as a permanent and heavily dependent client receiving dole from some foreign source; or complete collapse followed by absorption by an adjacent state. Egypt's position, though more favorable than that of Jordan, is nonetheless grim. Egypt has lost her Suez Canal revenues and her Sinai oil fields, which had produced nearly 40 per cent of her domestic oil requirements. Her tourist industry, a major earner of foreign exchange, is in ruins.

The Israelis recognize that the nature of the Arab response to these facts is for the present in hot dispute between the "progressive" and "conservative" Arab factions. The Algerians, materially unscathed by the war and by the postwar Arab economic boycott of the United States and Britain, and the Syrians, who put practical issues even further to the rear than most Arabs, are the main partisans of the revolutionary club, and it is they who urge that the war should continue through military coordination, guerrilla activity and all other possible means—presumably until the Arabs are ready to make their own preemptive military strike.

But it is the conservative countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya—who have most of the oil, most of the money, and most of the means of exerting leverage on the West in order to procure consideration of the Arab

viewpoint. Here the Israelis have some small grounds for optimism. Originally, the three conservative countries proclaimed a boycott of oil shipments to the Western powers who had been accused of actively aiding Israel in the war. The boycott, however, was very ineffective and in any case lasted only a few weeks. And within three months after the end of the war, oil was flowing, at a somewhat increased rate, from the Arab oil-producing states to their usual consumers in the West. Second, although the three conservative Arab states have pledged a fund of approximately \$300 million for emergency support of Egypt and Jordan, there is no evidence that this support has in any way drawn them closer to the ideological position of the Arab revolutionaries. Indeed, the conservative states have in effect washed their hands of the strident Algerian-Syrian leadership. It is possible to interpret these signs to mean that Arab solidarity in dealing with problems of the Middle East is a myth being laid to rest by events.

To the Israelis, the main point is that however the Arabs coordinate their diplomatic, military and economic efforts (presuming they manage to coordinate them) they will still be faced with an entirely new situation. First of all, it seems clear that the Arabs have been deserted by the Soviet Union, their main international sponsor. Arab awareness of this commenced in June, 1967, when the Soviet Union agreed with the West to seek a cease-fire in the war. This unexpected Russian move caused utter dismay to the proponents of "wars of national liberation" throughout the Arab world. The Arab leaders regarded the Soviet refusal to go to the military assistance of the Arab forces as a diplomatic defeat comparable to the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba in 1962. It has now become plain to the Arabs that the Soviet Union willingly fishes in the troubled waters of the Middle East but will not risk its own security on behalf of its so-called friends in the Arab world.

Although the Soviet Union has tried and will doubtless continue to try to reestablish the patron-client relationship it previously

enjoyed with several Arab countries, there are few observers willing to predict its success. Failing Chinese sponsorship, which is of dubious utility and probably unacceptable in any case, the Arabs must for the most part rely on their own resources. They are now being forced to try to face the facts, but the difficulty so far is that they do not accept the facts as others see them. To the Israelis, this was the meaning of the unproductive intervention of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia on behalf of an Arab-Israeli settlement. The terms of the settlement the Arab leaders would accept, at the end of Tito's diplomatic mission to Damascus, Cairo and Khartoum, were vastly different from those which the Israelis demand.

Israel has not budged from the determined position she took in the immediate postwar days: the reward of her victory should be peace. Limited Arab concessions, even if they were offered, would be insufficient. Israel's official stand, proclaimed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and supported by all major Israeli political parties, is that she will not give up any of the land she has won until the Arab governments agree to direct negotiations leading to peace settlements. There is no meeting ground between Israel's demand for peace and the Arabs' demand for unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. And since there is no meeting ground, and thus no possibility of bargaining, Israel has not felt impelled to modify her maximum demands.

However, time seems to be on Israel's side. The longer the Arabs hesitate, the more the amount of occupied territory Israel is prepared to bargain away may shrink. Israel has already stated, and has verified by her actions, that unified Jerusalem is not negotiable. Since no great power is going to force Israel to throw away all her newly-won cards by an unconditional withdrawal, and since the Arabs refuse direct negotiations, what may happen is a freezing of the present territorial status quo and a *de facto* incorporation of the territory into a greatly enlarged state of Israel.

This is by no means an unlikely course of

events and for Israel, indeed, there is an important historical precedent. In 1948, when Israel was founded, her frontiers were quite different from those the United Nations had recommended in its Palestine partition resolution the previous year. Events then defined Israel's territory as that land which the Israeli armed forces had managed to take and hold. The "diplomacy of fait accompli," made possible through Israeli military superiority, has, after all, been one of Israel's most powerful weapons throughout her 20 years of existence.

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

There is a danger that Israel's concentration on the diplomatic problems resulting from the war will cause her to neglect the domestic economic situation. This would be very serious because the economy is in difficulty. As she entered the war, Israel was in the grip of a severe recession with her economy faltering badly under the burdens of widespread unemployment and sharply reduced capital investment. The war solved the unemployment problem overnight but demobilization, now nearly complete, has re-created it. Thirty-five thousand Israeli workers are officially registered as unemployed; the real figure is probably much larger and does not include underemployment. In a work force of 950,000 persons, it is clear that Israel has an employment crisis of major proportions.

Before the war, it was generally agreed among Israeli economists that agriculture and services, the nation's principal sources of employment, had expanded as far as possible. Another factor in the recession was the sharp cutback in the construction industry. Since 1950, \$2.2 billion, or 29 per cent of Israel's investment total, was poured into construction of housing and other facilities for the steady flow of immigrants. After a dozen years of frantic efforts to provide enough housing for the immigrants, the building industry caught up with and outstripped the immigration rate. By 1964, there was a surplus of flats and dwellings in most Israeli cities and towns; at the same time, immigra-

tion dropped off precipitously. As a result, the building boom, which had been one of the major factors in the economy for over a decade, suddenly ended.

In addition to these prewar problems, the economy must now cope with the complications brought on by the victory over the Arabs. Chief among these is the Israeli-occupied west bank of the Jordan River with its 700,000 population, its low standard of living and widespread unemployment. The average per capita annual income in the west-bank area in 1965 was \$216, compared to \$1200 in Israel. Moreover, west-bank exports that accounted for \$14 million in 1966 went almost exclusively to Arab countries, whose markets are now closed. The west-bank tourism industry has nearly disappeared and the approximately \$20 million annually spent by the Jordanian government on the west bank, mainly for defense, is also gone. A preliminary reckoning suggests that if she continues to occupy the west bank, as seems likely, Israel will have to pump at least \$50 million a year into the region to avoid economic disaster and the resulting chaos.

This combination of old and new economic problems has produced a condition that demands remedial action. For this reason, shortly after the war, the Israeli government convened a top-level conference of 60 Jewish businessmen from 13 countries. These visitors, including outstanding figures from the commercial communities of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, South Africa and France, were asked to instruct Israeli officials on how Israel might attract foreign investment and stimulate the marketing of Israeli products abroad. The distinguished visitors drew up a detailed report of criticism, singling out the well-known factors of red tape,

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Dwight James Simpson has had many years of experience in the Middle East; including a term as president of Robert College of Istanbul (1966-1967) and a visit to study the Negev region of Israel. He was formerly chairman of the Area Studies Program at Williams College.

According to this specialist "The struggle between the revolutionary and conservative [Arab] camps constituted the essence of Arab politics in the 1950's and 1960's." Interestingly, this struggle took precedence over the Arab-Israeli dispute; however, since the June, 1967, war "both camps have experienced inner realignments."

Arab Bloc Realignments

BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

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THE JUNE, 1967, war shook the Arab world profoundly, primarily in terms of inflicting upon it its greatest historical humiliation. Arabs have always considered themselves a virile and martial race; their conquests in the hundred years between 630 and 730 A.D. were an extraordinary feat of arms, courage and organization. Even though they later suffered conquests at the hands of the Mongols, Turks, British, French and Italians, they could find consolation in the fact that their conquerors were bigger, richer and better armed. The Arabs' frantic search for foreign scapegoats (the United States, Britain and West Germany) in the wake of the June war and their initial popular willingness to accept Nasser's allegation of American-British collusion in the June 5 Israeli attack on Arab armies may largely be explained as a psychological compensatory mechanism working to heal the wounds inflicted on Arab pride and self-respect.

Of the 13 Arab states, the territories of three (Egypt, Jordan and Iraq) were partly overrun and occupied by Israel, while two others—Iraq and Kuwait—whose forces were sent to Jordan and Sinai, respectively, suffered some damage and destruction at the hands of the Israelis. Algerian airplanes sent to Egypt via Libya arrived too late to be of any use while the partially mobilized forces of other Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, never succeeded in reaching the

battlefields due to the swiftness of Egyptian-Jordanian collapse.

Thus it is clear that the exposure of various Arab states to the conflict was uneven, both in terms of participation and in terms of damage suffered. The two principal losers were Jordan and Egypt, with Syria following closely. Under the circumstances, the questions arise: what impact has the crisis had on the strength and influence of the Arab governments in domestic and inter-Arab relations? can the old (i.e., pre-June) division into radical, conservative and the "third force" camps still be considered valid?

Before the June crisis the Arab world could be viewed as divided into two camps. The radical-revolutionary camp comprised the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and the Republican regime in war-torn Yemen. The U.A.R.'s role in this camp was paramount; the Yemen regime was no more than Cairo's satellite, while Iraq's posture toward U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership was that of deference, occasionally bordering on obsequiousness. Although Baathist Syria has had a fairly long record of mutual suspicion and quarreling with Egypt, she had reestablished an ostensibly cordial relationship with Cairo beginning in mid-1966. As for Algeria, she was pursuing her own path, subject to no one's influence, but drawing closer to Egypt after the initial cooling-off of relations caused by

Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella's ouster and the advent to power of Colonel Houari Boumedienne.

The other Arab camp could be described, for want of a better word, as conservative or moderate. It consisted of the five Arab monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait and Morocco. Definitely anti-revolutionary and bent on preserving their royal establishments, these states were not necessarily conservative in the socio-economic sense. In fact, much progress and constructive development could be observed in some of them, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Their evolution toward modernization was partly spontaneous, due to the free play of unhampered economic forces in an environment of oil-generated abundance, and partly state-sponsored, as attested by Saudi King Faisal's ten-point reform program of 1962 and the United States-supported planned development of Jordan. Leadership in this camp was clearly exercised by Saudi Arabia, whose conflict with Egypt over Yemen (with its ramifications in Aden) starkly symbolized the deep cleavage between the two camps.

In addition, a few Arab countries did not clearly belong to either of the two camps. These included Lebanon, always anxious to maintain correct neutrality and preserve her own interdenominational balance; Tunisia, a modernizing "guided democracy," strongly anti-U.A.R., yet unwilling to identify herself with the conservative camp; and Sudan, a country recently returned to a civilian constitutional regime and thus implicitly critical of any military dictatorship including that of her northern neighbor. If the label "conservative" could not be attached to these states, they nevertheless shared with the five monarchies the general attitude of moderation in the domestic as well as the foreign sectors.

The struggle between the revolutionary and the conservative camps constituted the essence of Arab politics in the 1950's and 1960's. It overshadowed all other problems, including even that of Arab-Israeli relations. The Arab states' foreign policy, i.e., their relationship to outside powers, has to some ex-

tent been a function of this basic struggle.

PRE-CRISIS SHOW OF UNITY

In the period immediately preceding the June war and during the war itself, the Arab states made a certain show of unity. Thus a conference of Arab oil ministers held in Baghdad June 1-4, 1967, decided to deny oil to those foreign states who took a stand inimical to the Arabs. In the military field, more energetic efforts were made to implement the earlier agreements which had established the Unified Arab Command. These efforts resulted in closer Syrian-U.A.R. military cooperation, in the dispatch of Iraqi troops to Jordan on the eve of the war, and, most important, in the conclusion, on May 30, of a military agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser whereby the Jordanian army was pledged to enter the war in case of the outbreak of U.A.R.-Israeli hostilities.

In implementing these agreed-upon measures a degree of unity was maintained. Thus, in the economic sector, a temporary shutdown of oil operations and exports was ordered by both the producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, Algeria) and the transit states (Syria and Lebanon). When, sometime in June, the total shutdown was lifted, a selective embargo on oil exports was imposed by the producing and transit countries against the United States, Britain and West Germany. Furthermore, dockyard workers refused to service American, British and West German ships in most of the Arab harbors (Basra, Beirut, Libyan Tripoli, and so on) whether or not their governments officially countermanded such action.

In the military sector, the most dramatic demonstration of unity was Jordan's plunge into the nearly-suicidal war once Egypt was attacked. By contrast, Syrian action on the front was negligible and showed little evidence of proper synchronization with Egyptian and Jordanian efforts. Israel's battle with Syrian forces and the subsequent occupation of Kuneitra and the Golan Heights came as a separate episode in the aftermath of the main war with Egypt and Jordan.

There the unity ended and, in a number of ways, differences of approach to the problems of foreign policy and economic sanctions became manifest.

To begin with, official Arab response to Nasser's charge of American-British participation in the Israeli attack of June 5 was uneven. As could be expected, the states of the radical camp severed diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain (unless these relations had already been broken off, as in the case of the U.A.R. and Britain). But other states, with the exception of Sudan, did not follow suit and, at most, demanded recall of ambassadors (as did Lebanon).

Similarly different were the Arab states' policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. While the governments of the radical camp continued their close relationships with Russia and emphasized them by hosting President Nikolai Podgorny (in the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq) and by much talk—in and out of the U.N.—of cordial Arab-Soviet friendship, the conservative camp shied away from close ties with the Soviets. In this respect, Saudi Arabia was most adamant and remained true to her traditional policy of nonrecognition in spite of Soviet attempts to open a dialogue with her delegates at the United Nations General Assembly.

However, the vacuum produced by the partial reduction of American influence did open some opportunities to Soviet penetration even in the nonradical Arab camp. Thus the Sudan government began negotiations to secure Soviet economic and arms aid, while the Kuwaiti oil minister and the Soviet minister of fisheries exchanged visits in the late summer of 1967.

A SPECIAL CASE: JORDAN

The single most outstanding development in this respect was the visit King Hussein paid to Moscow in early October, 1967. For many years Jordan had been regarded as solidly in the Western camp despite the lack of formal ties of alliance. Subsidized by the United States at the rate of \$49 million to \$50 million a year, supplied by Western arms, and supported by Washington and London

whenever her integrity was threatened by Cairo or Damascus, Jordan shunned diplomatic ties with Moscow; when, in the early 1960's, she finally established them, she acted primarily as a formal gesture to stress her sovereignty. As a result of the June crisis, the military and economic position of Jordan became desperate, with her air force obliterated and her main sources of domestic income—agriculture on the west bank and tourism to the Holy Places—drying out.

It should be pointed out that in midsummer King Hussein received informal Soviet offers to supply arms to Jordan. But his initial response, publicized by the press, was that he hoped help from the West would enable him to decline Soviet assistance. His summer visits to the Western capitals brought no spectacular results. Washington delayed its decision on the question of whether to renew its war-suspended aid to Jordan, while no definite commitment could be obtained from the Western capitals to replace, at least partly, its lost planes and military equipment.

Under the circumstances, the King decided to explore possible assistance from the Soviets; with this in mind, he visited the Russian leaders, accompanied by his chief of staff. His trip to Moscow did not result in the signing of any overt agreement. In all probability, Hussein preferred to secure informal pledges of support which could be used as a bargaining point in his subsequent talks in Washington during November. Formalizing an accord for substantial Soviet aid might be tantamount to burning the bridges with the West; it was doubtful whether the King had reached this point.

Hussein's visit in Moscow had another ancillary, though not unimportant, aspect. As a result of his decision to fight Israel in June—and in spite of his defeat—the King emerged as a hero of the Arab masses at home and abroad. His moment of triumph came when, on June 9, President Nasser gave him an accolade by calling him a "noble, and courageous man." Considering the past enmity between them, this public recognition changed overnight Hussein's status in the Arab world.

If an intransigent stand against Israel is a primordial mark of an Arab nationalist, neutralism and hobnobbing with the Soviets is a sign of a truly "emancipated" leader, at least in the political lexicon of those segments of Arab opinion which look toward Cairo, Damascus or Algiers for guidance and inspiration. Through his pilgrimage to Moscow, Hussein reaffirmed his nationalism and gained another personal advantage. As for his truncated country, with unemployment estimated at 25 per cent and with destitute masses of refugees, exposure to Soviet penetration may have grave consequences, if indeed exposure occurs. In the long run, the key to this dilemma rests with Washington's response to Hussein's renewed pleas for help.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: BETWEEN EXTREMISM AND REALISM

Differences in Arab attitudes became evident also with regard to economic sanctions against the West (meaning primarily the United States, Britain and West Germany). Here the dividing line broadly corresponded to the basic division between the radical and the conservative camps, but with some interesting exceptions. Initially, the selective oil embargo instituted by the producing and transit states did not reflect the divisions between the two camps. Among the states banning exports of oil were conservative Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait, as well as revolutionary Algeria and Iraq. The conservative states applied this measure largely in response to Nasser's accusation of the West for its alleged military collusion with Israel on June 5. When, within a few weeks, this accusation was no longer accepted by the literate Arab public, the original ground for the embargo ceased to exist.

Conscious of the weakness of this claim, Cairo's propaganda readjusted its line to a general attack on the West for its partiality to Israel before, during, and after the war. Confronted with this change of tactics, the conservative oil-producing states found it difficult to lift the embargo without incurring the blame for breaking the common Arab front.

If the selective embargo was conceived as a punitive measure, it largely failed. In reality, it penalized the Arab oil-producing states more than the intended victims. For this reason, the conservative oil-producing states soon (in mid-summer, 1967) called for an early reconsideration of the hastily-adopted measures.

As an oil-producing state also suffering from the embargo, Iraq should have shared the attitudes of Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait. However, the fact that she had a revolutionary government closely collaborating with Egypt prevented her from following the path of realism. Instead, she went on record advocating an extreme policy of economic sanctions which recommended: (a) the total shutdown of oil production in all Arab states for three months; (b) an indefinite oil embargo against the United States, Britain and Germany after the resumption of production; (c) a total trade boycott of the above three Western countries; (d) the withdrawal of Arab deposits from these Western countries' banks; and (e) the nationalization of American and British interests in international concessionaire companies.

To what extent these proposals were taken seriously by their authors or were intended merely as a show of devotion to the Arab cause and as a domestic power play remains a matter of conjecture. As a propaganda thrust, they were geared to appeal to the least sophisticated and to the fanatics. Iraq was seconded by Algeria who could afford to be both virtuous and practical inasmuch as most of her oil exports went to France, and France—thanks to a few friendly gestures from President Charles de Gaulle—was at this juncture enjoying popularity in the Arab world and immunity from the embargo. Another strong backer of a rigid boycott was Syria who, as a transit country, had less to lose from an oil boycott than the producing states.

ECONOMIC FACTS

The facts of life, however, were on the side of the conservatives. An Arab oil boycott, even in its totality as proposed by Iraq, could

not make a serious dent in the economies of the Free World. The gross national product of the United States in 1967 was estimated at \$770 billion, of the four most developed West European states at \$375 billion, and of Japan at \$100 billion. Compared with this, the total Arab GNP was of minor proportions, amounting to \$20 billion.

As for a possible trade boycott, combined United States, United Kingdom and West German exports in 1967 were expected to reach the \$60 billion figure. Total Arab imports were worth \$3.5 billion, of which \$2 billion, i.e., more than half, came from these three Western countries. Instituting a trade boycott would thus bring about a major upheaval in Arab economies and development plans while making little difference to the Western economy as a whole.

As for oil, 50 per cent of the Free World's energy supplies consisted of oil and another 50 per cent of coal, atomic energy and water power. In 1967, the Free World was consuming a total of 31 million barrels of oil a day (b/d), of which 10 million barrels were of Arab and 1 million barrels were of Soviet origin. Total ban on Arab oil exports (as proposed by Iraq) would have deprived the Free World of about one-third of its oil supplies, but the West had stocks for about 90 days. This period would have been devoted to the stepping up of production in Venezuela, the United States, Canada and Iran, to increased oil exploration, to the reactivation and increase of coal production, and to the intensive development of atomic energy.

On the other hand, the indefinite embargo applied to the three "target" countries in the West would have entailed a ban on exports of 2.5 million b/d of oil. This amount represented merely 1/25 of the total active energy supplies in the Free World and its absence could in no way have been interpreted as a calamity for the West. By contrast, the embargo of 2.5 million b/d has meant a \$2-million daily loss of revenue to the Arab states.

¹ The summit conference was preceded by a second foreign ministers' conference, also held in Khartoum, August 25-28.

BAGHDAD AND KHARTOUM

Well aware of these facts, the Saudi Arabian government pressed for an early lifting of the embargo at the inter-Arab conferences which met in the late summer of 1967. The foreign ministers' conference at Khartoum (August 1-5), called to pave the ground for a possible Arab summit meeting, was followed by an Arab economic conference in Baghdad, attended by ministers of economy, finance, oil and development, to consider sanctions against the states supporting Israel (August 15-20). Recommendations formulated at this conference were then forwarded to the Arab summit conference, again at Khartoum (August 30-Sept. 1)¹ which was to consider the totality of political, military and economic problems created by the June war with Israel; it was called for the purpose of "erasing the consequences of aggression." The earlier mentioned Iraqi boycott plan was presented at the Baghdad meeting and the Saudi delegation, headed by Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani, voiced its opposition to it, quietly supported by other oil-producing monarchies. Without taking definite decisions, the conference submitted the matter to the summit meeting in Khartoum.

The Khartoum summit conference marked the victory of realism insofar as Arab-Western relations were concerned. Formal debates were accompanied by much behind-the-scenes maneuvering, especially between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia, with Sudan's Premier and Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, acting as an "honest broker." The main decisions were as follows:

- (a) to lift the selective oil embargo;
- (b) to keep the Suez Canal closed to traffic as long as Israel occupied its eastern shore;
- (c) to provide £135 million of financial aid to the U.A.R. and Jordan, to be supplied by Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait, the total to be paid in four installments and to be divided into £95 million for the U.A.R. and £40 million for Jordan.

Although the financial subsidy to Egypt was

officially conceived as compensation to this war-ravaged country for her loss of Suez Canal revenue (in a normal year close to \$300 million), in reality it was linked more to the lifting of the oil embargo and to the overall bilateral settlement of outstanding political issues between Cairo and Riyadh. This settlement was a byproduct of the conference and, in fact, constituted its primary success, although it was not listed among the formal collective resolutions. Its broad lines could be described as a *quid pro quo* deal between King Faisal and President Nasser. In return for the subsidy, Nasser agreed:

- (a) to evacuate Yemen by mid-December, 1967, this evacuation (together with Saudi nonintervention) to be supervised by a committee of three, representing Morocco, Iraq and Sudan.
- (b) to support the Saudi motion for the immediate lifting of the oil embargo;
- (c) to recognize (tacitly) that the Arabian Peninsula is not to be viewed as Egypt's sphere of influence—this having implications for the future of strife-torn Aden.

Implicitly, the settlement also meant that Nasser's erstwhile support of the dethroned King Saud, currently living in Cairo, would have to be abandoned.

The Khartoum summit conference accentuated the rifts existing in the revolutionary camp. While President Nasser struck a note of moderation, Syria, true to her radical policies, boycotted the conference, expecting no good from a meeting attended by the "reactionaries." Similarly, President Boumedienne of Algeria absented himself, sending instead his Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Although Iraq lost face by having her extreme boycott proposals repudiated, she declared her willingness to abide by the summit's decisions. The quiet victor of the conference was clearly King Faisal, whose realism and persistence over the Yemen and South Arabian issues yielded the desirable harvest of inter-Arab agreements.

This brings us to the impact of the June crisis on the Arab governments themselves.

In relative terms, the Saudi position was strengthened at home and abroad in spite of a number of embarrassing imperfections of the Saudi state apparatus, such as the inability, in the days of June crisis, to counter effectively the Egyptian propaganda monopoly over the radio virtually all over the Arab East.

By contrast, the U.A.R. government's position was weakened at home and abroad in both absolute and relative terms. Although Nasser's mishandling of the military and political aspects of the June crisis did not result in his downfall and—paradoxically—even evoked manifestations of pro-Nasser feeling, in the long run a leader who has lost a war must account to his constituency for his ineptness. Purges in the Egyptian army and security police, a reported plot among the military, as well as the sudden death of Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer (officially described as suicide) point to the serious strains in the Egyptian political establishment. Criticisms of Nasser in other Arab countries have gained in intensity with the passage of time. Continuous closure of the Suez Canal places Egypt in a most difficult economic situation. To survive, Egypt will have to depend on outside assistance: Arab (such as promised at Khartoum, but for a price), Soviet or Western. This explains the more conciliatory tone toward the West which *Al-Ahram*'s editor and Nasser's unofficial spokesman, Mohammed Hassanein Haikal, has adopted in a number of editorials and in an article in the London *Sunday Times* on September 10, in which he called for a "dialogue" between Cairo and the West.

(Continued on page 384)

George Lenczowski lived in the Middle East from 1938 to 1945. His most recent trip to that area was made in late summer, 1967, during which time he studied the effects on the Arab states of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. His most recent book is *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3d ed.; Cornell University Press, 1962).

Prior to June, 1967, ". . . both Israel and the Arab states refused to resolve the refugee problem for reasons either pragmatic or ideological. . ." However, our author concludes that in view of the present situation in the Middle East, Israel realizes ". . . that a solution is favorable to her own interests. . ."

The Arab Refugee Problem

By JOHN B. WOLF

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EVOLVING GRADUALLY from the recent conflagration in the Middle East are political and ideological adjustments which fail to resolve the plight of the Arab refugees. Their misfortune, caused by the 1948-1949 campaign between the Arab and Israeli armies which resulted in the departure from Palestine of almost 650,000 completely destitute refugees,¹ was aggravated by the recent conflict and by the inflexible position that has been assumed by both Israel and the Arab states for the past 19 years.

Controversy persists as to why the original refugees left Palestine. The Israelis claim that they fled because of Arab League propaganda which convinced them that they would be able to return once the Arab armies were victorious. The Arabs say that the refugees left because of brutal acts committed by Jewish terrorist organizations.² A similar

dispute developed as a result of the exodus of refugees during the fighting in June, 1967. The Arabs insisted that the 1967 flight was induced by the horrors of war and by the refugees' desire to obtain food and shelter. But Israel claims that many refugees left to join relatives on the east bank of the Jordan River or to obtain the financial assistance of family wage earners employed in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, which would not be available to them if they remained in Israeli-occupied territory.³ Regardless of which assertion is most accurate, on both occasions the refugees seem to have fled, as refugees have always fled, from the detonation of the grenade and the movement of troops.

Essentially, the Arab refugee problem differs from many other refugee problems because the passing of almost 20 years and the evolution of a new generation of refugees within the camps have intensified rather than modified its impact. According to the 1966 report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), by natural increase the original refugee population of almost 650,000 has now become about 1,317,000. However, this figure is slightly inflated because the refugees occasionally conceal the deaths of companions from United Nations officials, so that they can utilize the ration cards of the deceased

¹ U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Fourth Session, 1949, Summary Records of Meetings September 27-December 7, 1949*, 51st meeting, p. 309, para. 24.

² U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Fourth Session, 1949, Annex Vol. II*, see Document A/838, pp. 3-4, Document A/927, pp. 6-7 and Document A/992, pp. 10-13.

³ For the Arab position see U.N. Security Council, Provisional Records, *Documents S/PV-1336* of June 10, 1967, pp. 86-88 and *S/PV-1335* of June 10, 1967, pp. 51-56. Israel's view is expressed in Security Council, Provisional Records of June 13, 1967, *Documents S/PV-1338*, pp. 111-115.

to obtain extra food.⁴ But as nearly as can be ascertained, about 800,000 refugees were living in the territory occupied by the Israeli army in June, 1967. The Israelis overran settlements in southwestern Syria, occupied by at least 15,000 refugees, camps in the Gaza Strip, containing about 307,000, and locations in Jordan, where there were approximately 440,000.⁵

Another 400,000 Arabs, the nonrefugee population of Jordan's west bank disturbed by the recent fighting, are technically not refugees, but can be more properly described as "war casualties" or "displaced persons." Currently, UNRWA is not empowered to assist these people; its mandate, received from the United Nations General Assembly in 1950, specifies that a bona fide Palestinian refugee is an individual whose normal residence was in Palestine for a minimum period of two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost his home and means of livelihood.⁶

UNRWA AND THE REFUGEE

After the fighting in 1949, large camps were established in the Gaza Strip, near selected Lebanese cities, and on sites in southern Syria and in Jordan. Originally these facilities were intended to serve only as temporary accommodations but eventually most became permanent quarters for refugees and

⁴ U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. *Report Of The Commissioner General Of The United Nations Relief and Works Agency For Palestine Refugees In The Near East, Supplement No. 13 (A/6313)*, July 1, 1965-June 30, 1966, p. 42, Annex I, Table I.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43 Annex I, Table II and U.N. General Assembly, *Fifth Emergency Special Session Agenda, Item 5, Document A/6723*, June 19, 1967 and *Document A/6723/Add.1*, July 4, 1967.

⁶ U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. *Resolutions Fourth Session, September 20-December 10, 1949*, Resolution No. 302, p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. The Report of UNRWA's Commissioner General, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-31 and tables.

⁹ U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees In The Near East. *UNRWA Reviews, A Background Information Series, Information Paper No. 1* (Beirut: UNRWA, 1962) pp. 1-3; also the agency's publication *UNRWA, 1967* (New York: UNRWA, 1967) pp. 6-7 and pp. 18-19.

their families. The organization concerned exclusively with refugee welfare is UNRWA, established in 1950 by the United Nations to provide relief services for the Palestine refugees and to help them become self-supporting,⁷ and designed as a temporary nonpolitical organ of the United Nations General Assembly. UNRWA's humanitarian operations, exercised during the past 17 years, have received little publicity. Employing more than 10,000 persons, mainly refugees, the agency distributes a basic food ration twice monthly to 882,000 refugees; provides shelter for another 470,000 in 57 camps; operates or subsidizes 123 health centers; and educates about 200,000 children in schools operated under the guidance of UNESCO. Approximately 42 per cent of the agency's annual budget of \$39 million is spent on establishing educational programs for the refugees, one-half of whom are below the age of 18. UNRWA attempts to ensure a minimum of six years of schooling for all refugee children.⁸

Last June the agency reported that of the original refugees about 20 per cent were business or professional men or skilled laborers and their families. Most of them became self-supporting, for their skills were in demand. Today many refugee families have sons working in the oil fields of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia who provided them with financial assistance before monetary transfer restrictions were imposed by Arab governments during the 1967 fighting. However, of the 307,000 refugees living in the Gaza Strip, only 70,000 have working heads of families; because they were restricted by their Egyptian hosts, few young men from this area ever emigrated. The majority of the refugees—farmers, herders, unskilled workers and the aged—have no industrial skills and require constant assistance because the countries providing them sanctuary already have a surplus of unskilled labor, a shortage of arable land and natural resources, and an uncertain political outlook.⁹

Regardless of UNRWA's activities, life in the refugee camps is miserable. At Rafah, a large camp in the Gaza Strip sheltering more than 40,000 people, overcrowded con-

ditions necessitate strict compliance with regulations designed to prevent epidemics and pestilence. Dwellings constructed of mud-brick or concrete block, in which up to five members of a family share one small room, are standard accommodations. Conditions are not likely to improve. Spending 42 per cent of its budget on education and over 50 per cent on basic subsistence rations, supplementary feeding and health care, UNRWA cannot render further assistance. Currently, the agency must rely on voluntary organizations to collect clothing. The refugee's food ration, consisting entirely of dry foodstuffs at a cost of four cents for each individual a day, is admittedly less than is needed for bare subsistence, and is only two-thirds of the food normally consumed by a poor person living in the Middle East. Flour is the main item in the ration. However, fresh meat and other foods, either grown by the refugees themselves or purchased with their limited earnings, often lend variety.¹⁰

Today, the enormously difficult problem of caring for refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East has become more intricate as a result of the swift Israeli offensive that motivated about 100,000 west-bank Palestinians to flee to the eastern shore of the Jordan River. The same offensive, as it moved across the Sinai Desert toward its objectives in the Suez Canal Zone, also encircled the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. Consequently, the world community has focused renewed attention on the painful problem of what should be done to improve conditions for these unhappy people.

As in the 1956 Suez episode, Israel has stated publicly that she could provide water, electricity and employment for them.¹¹ However, other reports indicate that Israel's internal political and economic situation has

necessitated the application of a selective policy concerning the populations engulfed by her military units. This may explain why Israeli announcements made last June encouraged Arab residents to leave strategic areas near the frontier, warned residents in other areas that they could not return if they left and declared that those in still other areas such as Jerusalem could remain. After speaking with numerous refugees and displaced persons, International Red Cross officials reported that many said that they were not forced to leave their homes but that the Israelis had indicated that transportation was available to move them to Arab-occupied Jordan.¹²

EMERGENCY RELIEF

Immediate aid granted to those displaced by the recent fighting was an "emergency relief family kit" distributed by UNRWA. Each kit, assembled at a cost of about \$10, provided basic kitchen equipment and household supplies for one family. Additional assistance was received from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which authorized an immediate \$200,000 in aid to mothers and children among the fleeing population; from the United States, which airlifted 10,000 tents to Jordan; and from Canada, which sent supplies of wheat flour and foodstuffs. The Soviet Union promised to dispatch medical aid and assistance. However, the refugees, whose misfortune was eased temporarily, probably will not receive the political support required to eliminate their continuing dilemma. Debates among member states of the United Nations have precluded an expanded role for UNRWA and have stripped an Israeli proposal—sanctioning the agency to continue its relief program in the occupied areas—of any connotation that implied United Nations recognition of Israeli claims over occupied territories. Consequently, the agreement concerning UNRWA finally accepted by the United Nations implies no commitment or position with regard to the status of any of the areas in question and is concerned solely with the continuation of the humanitarian

¹⁰ U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. The Report of UNRWA's Commissioner General, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-55, tables 5-16 and *UNRWA, 1967*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹¹ U.N. General Assembly. *Fifth Emergency Special Session Agenda Item 5, Document A/6723/Add 1*, July 4, 1967.

¹² *The New York Times*, June 13, 1967, p. 19 and June 22, 1967, p. 17. Also, *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 24, 1967, p. 2.



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THE ARAB REFUGEES

task of the agency to assist Palestinians who became refugees in 1948.¹³ In addition, UNRWA's annual operating costs, currently \$39 million a year, have met growing resistance in the United States and in other countries that have contributed heavily to its operating expenditure of \$558 million since 1950.¹⁴

Furthermore, prior to the recent outbreak of fighting in the Middle East, both Israel and the Arab states refused to resolve the refugee problem for reasons either pragmatic or ideological or both. Insisting that the absorption of the refugees into adjacent lands would imply Arab approval of continued retention by Israel of refugee property and would indicate a tacit Arab recognition of Israel, the Arabs say that the refugee problem is the responsibility of the great powers that helped create the Jewish state.¹⁵

Also, it can be suggested that many Arab states may be reluctant to solve a problem that attracts international support and regional endorsement of policies only distantly related to the humanitarian issue of the Arab refugee.

OBSTACLES TO RESETTLEMENT

Nevertheless, any cursory investigation which concludes that a large number of refugees can be settled readily within states contiguous with Israel is inaccurate. Situated to the north of Israel is Lebanon, a country whose existence depends upon the maintenance of a tenuous balance between Christians and Muslims. Lebanon opposes resettlement

¹³ U.N. Security Council Provisional Records. Document No. S/PV 1361-14, June 14, 1967 pp. 3-5 and p. 42.

¹⁴ U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. The Report of UNRWA's Commissioner General, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7 and pp. 57-68, tables 18-20.

¹⁵ Muhammad Khalil, *The Arab States and The Arab League*, Vol. II (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), Document 86, p. 166, and Documents 83 and 85, p. 165.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Document 30, p. 15 and M. T. Meo Leila, *Lebanon Improbable Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 82-85.

¹⁷ Gordon H. Torrey, *Syrian Politics and The Military* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 387-394.

¹⁸ Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo: The National Publication House, 1955), pp. 26-27 and pp. 37-48.

because she fears that the refugees, the majority of whom are Muslims, would demand a national census once they were confident that the result would indicate a Muslim majority. Lebanon's constitution would then require that a Muslim rather than a Christian fill the country's highest office; it specifies that the Lebanese President must be a representative of the country's largest religious sect. For this reason, the Lebanese, content with their country's relatively prosperous economic life and mindful of the 1959 civil war which resulted from an attempt by their Christian President to perpetuate himself in power, refuse to accept a substantial number of refugees who might possibly alter the status quo.¹⁶

Syria, aware that refugees might aggravate her already chronic, economic and political instability, is also reluctant to absorb them. Perhaps one of the most notable features of Syrian politics is the propensity of many military officers and political doctrinaires to regard the coup d'état as an effective instrument of political change. The Syrian army, never having been integrated completely, is organized into units which tend to preserve both ethnic and religious dissimilarities. Hence, Syria's political climate precludes the influx of a large number of refugees into her territories, because these people would add another variable group to her already fragmented citizenry. The presence of the Arab refugees would also remind Syria's heterogeneous population of the role played by foreign powers in the creation of Israel and thus would probably provide the rationale for toppling any government that advocated development rather than ideology.¹⁷

In his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, Gamal Abdel Nasser implies that the Egyptian revolution is a sincere effort to obtain social justice, consisting of political, social and economic equality, for all Egyptians by replacing the monarchy and foreign influence with popular democracy.¹⁸ Presently, this revolutionary objective has not been realized, because chronic demographic and economic factors within the U.A.R. are retarding its attainment. Egyptian land, irrigated with

Nile River water and extremely limited, is expensive and overcrowded. Prior to the 1952 revolution, 72 per cent of all proprietors farmed less than one *feddan*—equal to 1.038 acres—although two *feddans* constituted an absolute minimum from which a family could make a living. In addition, about 1.5 million families owned no land at all and lived by share-cropping or casual labor. Because of his poverty and the abundance of cheap labor, the typical *fellah*—one owning less than five *feddans*—has neither the ability nor the incentive to use modern techniques. Complicating Egypt's problems are her rising birth rate and lack of food. The *fellah's* meals, maize bread, vegetables, some fruit and occasionally meat, are comparable somewhat to those offered the refugee.

Attempting to rectify conditions, the Egyptian government began construction of the Aswan High Dam. A means of increasing the cropped area possibly by about 25 per cent, the dam is at best a stop-gap measure, because Egypt's rising population will probably absorb the extra land by the mid-1970's.¹⁹ Thus for many decades Egypt will probably be confronted with a severe underemployment problem in both town and countryside, and with limited food supplies. Consequently, the country is haunted by the fear that distraught industrial workers will join with disillusioned military elements, frustrated with their recent defeat in Sinai, to detonate an "explosion in the street." Certainly, such conditions must be altered before a large number of refugees can be accommodated.

After the 1948–1949 struggle for Palestine, Jordan approached the refugee problem in a manner that was abhorred by her Arab neighbors. Jordan's King Abdullah envisaged a settlement with Israel as a method of improving his country's economic outlook and as an opportunity to open up new development possibilities by means of the assis-

tance he would obtain from the United Nations and the United States toward the rehabilitation of the refugees. Therefore, in 1950, after annexing the Arab-occupied portion of Palestine west of the Jordan River, King Abdullah willingly integrated its native and refugee populations into his kingdom on the bases of constitutional representative government and the equality of rights and duties of all citizens.²⁰ But the Palestinians had no loyalty for the Hashemite dynasty and neither intellectual, emotional or ideological attachment to monarchical rule. Subjected to constant internal pressure from their former political leaders, to nationalist agitation from Radio Cairo, and to propaganda from the Soviet Union expounded through local Communists, the Palestinians characterized King Abdullah's annexation of the west bank as a calculated scheme executed with Zionist approval. It soon became obvious that the annexation of Arab Palestine condemned Jordan at once to political instability and economic stagnation.

Almost immediately, friction between the monarchy and the Palestinians as to the character and nature of the government caused unrest. The Palestinians demanded political parties with platforms and programs and an end to the existing system of government that subjected the Parliament and cabinet to the pleasure of the King. The monarch's reaction was an increased inflexibility to change which was supported by his loyal Bedouin subjects. Finally, on July 20, 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated as he entered a mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem.

King Hussein, Jordan's present monarch, has also been exposed to constant pressure from the Palestinians. Two events, in 1957 and in the early winter of 1966, illustrate this point. In April, 1957, Jordan's Palestinian premier, still disturbed by the 1956 Suez Crisis, announced that his government had decided to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and to accept Soviet aid. He also insisted that the King must denounce the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had recently been declared as an elucidation of United

¹⁹ Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 74–108 and pp. 179–186 and Peter Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), pp. 168–191.

²⁰ King Abdullah of Jordan, *My Memoirs Completed (al-Takmilah)*, (Washington, D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954), pp. 17–22.

States policy in the Middle East, and must become more closely identified with Egypt. When the King refused, the premier resigned in protest. His resignation induced large elements of the Palestinian population to stage protest riots in the major cities of the west bank. However, the King used his army, composed mainly of loyal Bedouin troops, to quell the disturbances and restore order.²¹

The 1966 episode evolved from an Israeli retaliatory raid on the Jordanian settlement of Es Samu. Frustrated by their King's reaction to the raid (which, lacking military support from other Arab governments, could be only verbal) and dissatisfied with the status quo (which for many meant the drab penury of a refugee camp), many Palestinians hearkened to Ahmad Shukairy's program of action. In December, 1966, Shukairy, organizer and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which claims to represent the refugees, announced a program that envisaged the removal of all obstacles standing in the way of Palestine liberation, including "the whole regime in Amman from top to toe." Included in his organization was a military arm of trained Palestinians, many of them refugees. This group, snared in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli army in June, 1967, intended to utilize the tactics of Asian revolutionaries to regain their homeland.²²

These events and other developments prompted King Hussein to approach the recent refugee problem with both realism and caution. The King realized that an explosive situation might be created if he were forced to cede the west bank to Israel while refugees continued to seek sanctuary in his country. The fuse for the explosion could be an in-

creased refugee population in a reduced kingdom. Thus King Hussein encouraged the Arabs of the west bank to stand fast and requested others to return to their homes. Encouraged by many Palestinians from the west bank, who are currently confronted with prolonged Israeli occupation, Hussein seems to be advocating quietly the establishment of some form of Palestine entity on the west bank.²³ However, his public endorsement of this proposal would probably foment a torrent of criticism from other Arab leaders, who would identify his approval as treachery. Ironically, King Hussein, whose country was the only state to give the refugees citizenship "en bloc," finds the future of his dynasty contingent on a final solution to their problem.

ISRAEL'S POSITION

Before the outbreak of the recent fighting, Israel objected to the resettlement of numerous Arab refugees within her borders. Disclaiming any responsibility for the mass exodus of Arabs in 1948-1949, she insisted that their flight was a result of the war forced on Israel by the Arab governments and that any adjustment in their status must form an integral part of a general and final peace settlement. Furthermore, Israel emphasized that rehabilitation of the displaced Arabs could not occur while considerations of military security were still paramount and while Israel's economic and social development was paralyzed by mobilization. Consequently, an Israeli announcement, made after the termination of hostilities in 1949, indicated a willingness to repatriate a limited number of carefully screened refugees but reserved the right of the state to resettle them in areas where they would not impair either economic development or internal security. After withdrawing this offer, Israel

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²¹ Richard P. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs 1957* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 174-178.

²² Anthony Carthew, "For The Arabs Israel Does Not Exist" in *The New York Times Magazine*, December 18, 1966, p. 30; *The New York Times*, November 28, 1966, p. 7, and December 28, 1966, p. 12 and Saadat Hasan, *The Palestine Liberation Organization* (New York: *The Palestine Liberation Organization*, 1967), pp. 8-18.

²³ *The New York Times*, July 12, 1967, p. 1; and *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 30, 1967, p. 1.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

MODERN EGYPT. By TOM LITTLE.

(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 276 pages, bibliography, map and index, \$7.50.)

This brief but interesting study of the United Arab Republic is divided into two parts. The first section treats the history of Egypt from the uniting of the "two kingdoms" in 3188 B.C. to the ascendency of the Free Officers movement which eventually proclaimed the Republic of Egypt in 1953 A.D. The second part discusses in some detail the complexities of modern Egypt—the U.A.R.

Egypt was for many centuries subject to foreign domination; herein lies her eventually successful national movement. Five thousand years ago Egypt "fashioned one of the first, if not the first, complex and civilised" societies. During the time of bitter conflict between the Egyptian Church and the Byzantine Church, Alexandria "ceased to be a centre of learning" and Egypt's world influence declined rapidly. As a result of the struggle, she passed from the rule of Christian kings, turned to the Arabs for leadership and was ruled by them for 500 years. Never during this time did the Egyptians rule themselves.

Intermittently, the Egyptians struggled to rid their country of foreign domination. And, finally, in 1952, the Free Officers seized power; this was a thoroughly Egyptian movement and Gamal Abdel Nasser was the "first true Egyptian to rule his country since . . . the middle of the sixth century B.C."

At this point Mr. Little turns to the problems which surrounded the new leadership. The author details the seemingly interminable Suez Canal negotiations and the subsequent nationalization; the Egyptian reaction to the Western-proposed

Baghdad Pact and the entry of the Soviet Union as a factor in Egyptian policy; the Yemen war; Nasser's Pan-Arab policies; the continuing problem presented by the presence of a Zionist state; and a national economy plagued with difficulties.

Little sees Nasser sympathetically, but believes that he could be less intransigent in his "idealistic pursuit of non-alignment and opposition to colonialism and imperialism," and instead realistically seek friends.

A final chapter deals briefly with the June, 1967 war; however, reports since its writing have not always substantiated the author's facts.

T.D.

NO END OF A LESSON: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUEZ CRISIS. By ANTHONY NUTTING. (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1967. 194 pages, map, appendices and index, \$5.00.)

Anthony Nutting served as minister of state for foreign affairs in Anthony Eden's government. He was part of a very small coterie surrounding Eden and consequently knew in detail the unrecorded events and manueverings which resulted in the Suez Crisis. He resigned from the government in protest against the 1956 Suez affair.

In this fascinating account, Nutting reveals what happened to the protagonists during the crisis; he spares no one, least of all his mentor—Anthony Eden. However, his is not a harsh treatment of Eden; rather, we see Eden as an unfortunate victim of circumstances—particularly domestic—and as a man whose health is beginning to falter.

Eden entered the prime ministership with impressive credentials as a statesman and diplomat. Unlike Churchill, he had been sympathetic toward the Arabs. He had never particularly liked Nasser, but believed he was a better leader than Farouk. Nutting tells us that Eden's senti-

ments changed when King Hussein dismissed British General Glubb from the post of chief of the general staff and commander of the Arab Legion—the Jordanian army. Eden stubbornly saw this as a Nasser plot. Suddenly, he believed that "Nasser was our Enemy No. 1 in the Middle East. . . ."

Nutting views the Suez affair as a last gasp of British imperialism, which ended in humiliation for Britain and her leaders.

T.D.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN. By ROBERT O. COLLINS and ROBERT L. TIGNOR. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 164 pages, suggested readings and index, \$4.95.)

In this too-slim volume, the authors trace the ancient and modern history of Egypt and the Sudan—nations which share the waters of the Nile.

It is regrettable that the effect on Egypt of the rise of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict are largely ignored, possibly because the book was published prior to the June, 1967, conflict.

An attempt to set these "modern nations in historical perspective," the space limitations of the volume—164 pages—require an unfortunately superficial survey. T.D.

THE END OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE?

By GEORGES FRIEDMANN. Translated by ERIC MOSBACHER. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967. 305 pages and glossary, \$5.95.)

This is a welcome exploration of present-day Israel, particularly in light of the June, 1967, victories. Friedmann analyzes many of the difficulties faced by this small nation: her people have come from more than 100 countries; her population has grown considerably since 1948; she has conflicting economic sectors; some of the original principles on which the state was fashioned (such as the collective farm, *kibbutz*) must now be either streamlined or relinquished.

The author, a French sociologist, also

discusses the question of whether there is a Jewish people and whether the Jews constitute a national community, and concludes that "There is no Jewish nation. There is an Israeli nation." The Jew outside Israel must be left free to practice his religion, but owes allegiance only to the country in which he is a citizen. T.D.

THE SHAPING OF THE ARABS. By JOEL CARMICHAEL. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. 392 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.95.)

This survey traces the origins and historical development of the Arabs and the concept of an Arab people, from the time of Mohammad and the Koran to the Pan Arab movement in the Middle East today. Subtitled "A Study in Ethnic Identity," the book points up the ambiguities in the term "Arab" and its utilization as a unifying force after World War II by Egypt and other Middle Eastern nations.

The author notes that "speakers of Arabic have always been singularly attached to their language"; Arabic nationalism was therefore strengthened "as the sole criterion of national identity increasingly came to be language itself." The quarrels among the Arab states and their continuing hostility to Israel are also explored.

T.D.

ISRAEL. MIRACLE IN THE DESERT.

By TERENCE PRITTIE. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 233 pages and index, \$5.95.)

This history by the *Manchester Guardian's* diplomatic correspondent traces in glowing prose the political and technological development of modern Israel. The author discusses the problems posed for Israel by the desert, by inflation, by the "plethora" of political parties, by religious theocracy, and by her hostile Arab neighbors.

Far from scholarly, this survey lacks objectivity, although its often romanticized account of Israel today is highly readable.

T.D.

ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

(Continued from page 330)

cost of the equally large benefits for Jordan and the smaller ones for herself. Consequently, Israel launched her own project for exploiting her share of the river's waters through a large-scale diversion project.

But the most comprehensive harrassment measure was the Arab boycott of Israel. This was initiated against Israeli trade with Arab countries and was gradually extended to embrace all Israeli activities and to cover all countries that could be reached.

A particularly grave extension of the boycott took the form of a partial blockade of Israel in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Aqaba. Barred from the Suez Canal during the war, Israeli ships continued to be barred after the armistice on the grounds that Egypt remained formally at war with Israel. A 1951 ruling of the United Nations Security Council rejected the Egyptian argument and enjoined Egypt to desist, but instead of complying, Egypt went on in the years that followed to bar even goods to and from Israel carried on third-party ships. As for the Strait of Aqaba, in 1949 Egypt placed coastal guns at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula controlling the entrance to the strait, then moved on to interfere with traffic to and from the budding Israeli port of Elath, and in the next few years barred such traffic altogether. The combined effect of the Suez Canal and Aqaba blockade was to cut Israel off from convenient access to Asian and African markets and suppliers generally and Persian oil sources particularly, forcing her to buy the one to two million tons she needed in remote and more expensive markets.

Such was the gravity with which the Israeli government viewed the Aqaba blockade that in 1955 it decided in principle to go to war to remove it and left the execution to a convenient time, which came in October, 1956.

After May, 1950, the diplomatic and military conditions for a war policy appeared to be extremely unfavorable. On that date, the

United States, Britain and France jointly issued what came to be known as the Tripartite Declaration by which they pledged themselves to ration the supply of arms to the Arab countries and Israel so as to prevent the development of an arms race and the creation of an "imbalance" between the antagonists, and also made themselves the guarantors of the armistice borders against any attempt to alter them by force.

In the course of the years 1955-1956, two developments seemed to remove or weaken all limitations against war while providing the Egyptian leadership with reasons at least to contemplate a war-oriented policy. Already in the summer of 1954, the Egyptians had reached an agreement with the British on the evacuation of the Suez Canal base. By the fall of 1955, the British had completed their evacuation, thus removing the buffer of 80,000 troops that had stood between Egypt and Israel and freeing the Egyptian government to turn its attention to other arenas, including Israel.

AN ARMS DEAL

The other development began with the conclusion of an arms deal between Egypt and the Soviet Union, announced in September, 1955. Having come to power through a military coup and lacking other support at the outset, the new regime in Egypt had made the strengthening of the armed forces one of its basic objectives. This objective was neglected for a while for lack of attention and means, but was revived by a sudden flare up on the Israeli border in the early months of 1955. The Egyptian government turned to the United States with a request for arms but met with a conditioned response it considered unfavorable. However, an apparently unrelated development came to fruition just then which gave the Egyptians the chance to acquire all the arms they wanted from Soviet Russia.

That development was the alliance project promoted by Britain and the United States, subsequently known as the Baghdad Pact, which aimed at joining the Arab countries with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the two

Western powers in a Middle East defense grouping. The Egyptians began by suggesting an alternative plan based on a purely Arab grouping which would cooperate with the West, and ended up after their plan was spurned by launching an all-out diplomatic and propaganda attack against the government of Iraq which adhered to the pact and sought to recruit other Arab countries to it. As the Egyptian campaign against the Baghdad Pact gathered momentum, the Soviet leaders began to think of Egypt's rulers as possibly useful tacit allies in the endeavor to frustrate the Western plans and destroy the Western positions in the Middle East. Knowing the Egyptians' wish for arms, they offered to provide them, and in quantities and on terms that were extremely alluring. The Egyptians hesitated for a while out of concern for their relations with the United States and fear of the Russian embrace, but then took the plunge.

The deal, whose execution had begun by the time it was announced, immediately shattered the limitation on the level of armament imposed by the Tripartite Declaration. Whether it was also to destroy the declaration's balance of power principle and its diplomatic security guarantee depended on the signatory powers' willingness to provide Israel with weapons to counter the Egyptian acquisitions and their readiness to give a meaningful reaffirmation of the guarantee. Events showed that they were willing to do neither when action might have stopped a conflict they did not want and that, after a fashion, they did both when this was apt to make things worse.

As soon as the deal was announced, Israel asked the three Western powers, and Russia for good measure, to be allowed to purchase modern equipment to counterbalance the new Egyptian weapons. The United States, to whom Britain and France looked for a lead, promised to give "sympathetic consideration" to an Israeli shopping list; but five months later the "consideration" was still continuing though the "sympathy" had apparently dropped. For at the end of February, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said

that, "without prejudice" to Israel's arms request, he thought that she should rely for her safety not on arms (and implicitly not on any specific big power guarantee) but on the "collective security" of the United Nations.

The diplomatic reaction of the big powers was no less distressing to Israel. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden did try at first to get the United States to "put teeth" in the Tripartite Declaration but as the committee appointed for the purpose was consigned by the Americans to oblivion, Eden urged the Israelis to make territorial and other concessions to the Arabs in order to avert war. The United States not only procrastinated on the arms request and implicitly diluted the purport of its diplomatic commitment by virtue of the Tripartite Declaration, but decided to redouble its effort to woo Nasser by offering to help him build the Aswan Dam. The French government kept its counsel, but its concern with the implications of the arms deal seemed to lie elsewhere—in its implications for Algeria. The conclusion drawn from all this, by Arabs and Israelis, was that the declaration's diplomatic and arms balance limitations on war had gone by the board along with its limitation on the level of arms.

While this picture was gradually unfolding, the arms deal was having an electrifying effect in the area. Whatever Nasser's motives for the conclusion of the transaction, the Arab masses saw in it only the prospect for a successful showdown with Israel before too long. Nasser was impelled to respond to expectations placed in him with regard to Israel by immediately adopting a tough line toward her. This took the form of extreme verbal attack, and of *fida' iyyun* missions for sabotage and murder deep inside Israel. As the Israelis responded with massive murderous raids, there developed a momentum for war which rolled on independently of the circumstances that had started it.

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN

In the spring and summer of 1956, the diplomatic constellation which had left Israel isolated and anxious for six bleak months underwent a profound change in her

favor though not because of Israel herself or for anything she did. The French, having failed to make a bargain with Nasser on Algeria, began to sell arms to Israel in fairly large quantities on the theory that the enemy of the enemy is a friend. The United States, displeased with Nasser's continuing war on the Baghdad Pact and irked by his success in promoting an overturn of the government of Jordan in March, openly associated itself with the French action. Nasser, hoping to freeze the timid movement in America's position, retaliated by recognizing Communist China. Dulles, irked by Nasser's boldness and under pressure from Congress, emerged from a prolonged period of sullen reappraisal to cancel abruptly the United States' offer to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam. Nasser, anticipating such a step, as he later revealed, reacted swiftly by nationalizing the Suez Canal. With this, the thrusts and counter-thrusts reached the point of a showdown: Britain and France, the principal shareholders of the Suez Canal Company and the main users of the waterway, were determined to make Nasser "disgorge," while the United States backed its allies formally and sought worriedly to "defuse" the crisis.

We need not concern ourselves here with the three-month-long effort led by Dulles to settle the canal crisis by diplomatic means except to point out that it resulted in alienating the British and French governments from the American and impelled them to decide to take military action on their own against Nasser. Before doing so, they managed to secure the participation of Israel, which had ample reasons of her own to go to war.

The war began on October 29, 1956, with an Israeli air drop at the Mitla pass, east of the Suez Canal, which was followed by a dash by a mobile column across southern Sinai to join with the paratroopers. This movement was designed, according to plans worked out in advance, to give an "excuse" to the British and French to intervene in order to "protect" the Suez Canal. This, the two powers did the next day.

While this action was taking place, the diplomatic front came alive. In the United

Nations, the United States assumed a leading role in marshalling opposition to the Franco-British-Israeli action which expressed itself in a series of quickly and overwhelmingly adopted resolutions calling for immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. The Soviet Union, while seconding the United States' effort in the United Nations, sent a series of notes to the attacking powers culminating in one to Israel which questioned her future existence, and one each to France and Britain brandishing the implicit threat of using rockets against them if they did not desist immediately and withdraw their forces. By November 6, Britain and France agreed to cease fire immediately and to withdraw as soon as a United Nations Emergency Force, decided upon two days before, could take over their positions. Israel had actually ceased fire earlier and on November 8 she agreed to withdraw from *most* of the territory she had occupied.

The war relieved Israel of what might have been an immediate grave threat, but did nothing to further a solution of the conflict; on the contrary, the defeat inflicted by the Israelis upon the Egyptian army deepened the Arab desire for revenge, and their collusion with Britain and France gave substance to the Arab conviction that Israel was a tool of imperialism. It temporarily upset the military balance in the area by destroying much Egyptian equipment and putting out of action several Egyptian divisions; but the Russians immediately began to make up for the lost equipment and the rebuilding of the army was quickly resumed. The war did not alter the territorial situation either, since Israel was forced to cede back all the terrain she had captured. Israel did achieve free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, but even this was more a factual gain than a juridically-sanctioned accomplishment. Supporting it was the presence of United Nations troops at Sharm-el-Sheikh, at the entrance of the gulf, and an assurance on the part of the United States that it would uphold the exercise of the right of innocent passage by Israel and other nations in what it considered to be

international waters. On the other hand, the Egyptians did not formally acknowledge Isreal's right and they could, at their discretion, dismiss the United Nations troops.

The Egyptians' forbearance of United Nations troops at the tip of the Gulf of Aqaba and along their border with Israel did not mean that Nasser was avoiding unwitting war in order to tread unwittingly on the road to peace with Israel; on the contrary, Egypt's orientation toward integral Arab unity shortly after the Sinai War committed her more than ever before to the ultimate destruction or dismemberment of Israel.

ISRAEL AFTER VICTORY

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high taxes, limitless bureaucracy, government competition with private enterprise, and vested interests of the trade unions as major impediments to Israeli progress. Any implementation of reforms, however, will require great political courage since the economy, although badly malfunctioning in a general sense, meets the desires of the particular special interest groups for which it provides a featherbedded and relatively secure existence.

POLITICAL COALITION?

Consequently, one of the crucial debates in Israeli politics centers on the question of economic reform. Whatever reforms are eventually adopted will depend primarily on the identity of the next prime minister of Israel, following the expected retirement from active politics of the present prime minister, Levi Eshkol. The most significant development in Israeli politics has been the approval by the 300-membér central committee of the Mapai party, the ruling party of Israel and Eshkol's main base of support, of a three-party merger which would create a united labor party with control of 55 seats in the 120-seat *Knesset* (parliament). The merger will unite the middle-of-the-road Mapai party with the left-wing Ahdut Avodah headed by Yigal Alon, and the moderately socialist Rafi party led by former Prime Minister David

Ben-Gurion and war hero and present minister of defense, General Moshe Dayan.

If it functions effectively, this coalition will almost certainly be able to dominate the *Knesset* and win a major victory at the next general election which is scheduled for late 1969 but could be held earlier in the event of Eshkol's retirement. Another major result of the coalition will be to push to the foreground two leading contenders for the prime minister's position, Yigal Alon and Moshe Dayan. Both men are military heroes, Brigadier General Alon in the Israeli-Arab war of 1948 and General Dayan in 1956 and 1967. Both have said they favor permanent retention of all Israeli-occupied territories and their integration into Israel's economic and political system. Both advocate some basic structural reforms of the Israeli economy and an abandonment of the ideologically-inspired shibboleths long honored by veteran Zionists, including the unproductive *kibbutzim* (communally-operated agricultural settlements). Each supports warm relations with the Western powers, a pragmatic, businesslike approach to the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe, and a stern posture to the Arab states which will accurately reflect the relative disparities of Arab-Israeli power.

For the present, Dayan holds a substantial lead over Yigal Alon in their race to the premiership. Dayan's military brilliance, his self-confidence and decisiveness, and his personal flamboyance combine to make him a charismatic leader with great electoral appeal. At the same time, however, many serious observers question if Dayan, who is deliberately unconventional, openly contemptuous of party politics and the intricacies of governmental processes and who sometimes gives the impression of arrogant self-assurance, is sufficiently mature and balanced to be entrusted with Israel's highest political office.

But it is easily arguable that, for the dangerous near future at least, Israel needs the leadership of a decisive, military-trained politician whose greatest asset is his unbroken habit of victory over the Arabs. For there can be no permanent peace in the Middle

East until the Arab nations agree to negotiate directly with Israel, sign a peace treaty, and establish diplomatic relations. As we have seen, however, given the realities of the Middle East today, any observer who would predict that this will happen soon is indeed an optimist.

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

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subsequently announced another arrangement which indicated her willingness to reunite minor sons, single daughters and wives with parents and husbands. This offer was accepted by about 4,000 refugees.²⁴ Nonetheless Israel, aware of the persuasive effect of propaganda and uncertain of the loyalty of its 300,000 Arab minority, regulated their movements. Restrictions limiting free daylight movement of Arabs in major population centers were enforced until 1959 and regulations establishing military governments in Arab communities were not suspended until November, 1966. Arabs are still required to obtain travel permits from the police before visiting sensitive border areas.²⁵

Certain economic realities should be evaluated along with the security considerations in any assessment of Israel's present capacity to resettle refugees. As the fighting began in June, 1967, Israel was experiencing a recession caused partly by a continuing trade deficit. The imbalance, approximately \$500 million a year, was decreased somewhat because of the influx of foreign aid and the World War II reparations from West Ger-

many coming to an end. However, all this assistance failed to check a descending economic spiral that was accelerated by a decrease in immigration and a government decision to deflate by reducing credits and financing.²⁶ The reaction of the Israeli people to this unaccustomed austerity alarmed the government; riots and demonstrations protesting the severe unemployment and poverty erupted in Tel Aviv in March, 1967.

A survey undertaken by Dr. Israel Katz, director of the School of Social Work at Hebrew University, indicates the extent of the poverty problem as it then existed in Israel. He reported that 300,000 Israelis were living below the poverty level; figures revealed by Israel's labor minister, Yigal Allon, explain this condition. Allon reported that in the last quarter of 1966, 90,000 Israelis were unemployed out of a labor force of 953,000 and that most of the jobless and unemployed were *Sephardim*, so-called "Oriental Jews" from the Arab world without the skills and initiative of the Jews of European ancestry.²⁷ Partly responsible for the continuing plight of the *Sephardim* is their non-Western heritage, which limits their desire to absorb the skills and knowledge transmitted to them through an education program sponsored by the state. Consequently, the resettlement of a substantial number of Arab refugees in Israel would probably aggravate existing social and economic problems that the government presently finds difficult to solve.²⁸

THE "NEW REALITIES"

However, the 1967 success of Israeli arms prompted Tel Aviv to review its refugee policy. Based on what she termed the "new realities"; namely, that most of the refugees of the Gaza Strip and Jordan's west bank were contained within Israeli lines, Israel decided to assume the initiative and to resettle the refugees. In July, 1967, she appointed a committee of experts to devise a system to facilitate the integration of refugees into the Arab communities in her occupied territories. When implemented, this program will decrease the populations of the

²⁴ Joseph B. Schechtman, *The United States and The Jewish State Movement* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1966), pp. 383-390 and James G. McDonald, *My Mission In Israel 1948-1951* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951).

²⁵ *The New York Times*, December 1, 1966, p. 20, and July 29, 1967, p. 1.

²⁶ U. S. *News and World Report*, "Interview With Prime Minister Levi Eshkol," April 17, 1967, pp. 75-77.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, March 12, 1967, p. 2; March 15, 1967, p. 1; March 21, 1967, p. 5; April 16, 1967, p. 19.

²⁸ Terence Prittie, *Israel, Miracle In The Desert* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 89-106.

camps but will not provide for the resettlement of refugees within the territorial borders of Israel as presently demarcated. In the meantime, Tel Aviv agreed to allow refugees and displaced persons from the west bank to return to their homes once their written applications were approved by Israeli authorities. The form, which indicated the applicant's personal recognition of the state of Israel, was submitted with a passport or an identity card for official scrutiny to the Israeli military government of the west bank. After the security check, only those refugees not regarded as "risks to security" or to "legal order" were allowed to return. But in July, 1967, as Israel began readmitting selected individuals to the west bank, others crossed the Jordan River, seeking sanctuary in Arab-held territory.²⁹

HOPE FOR THE REFUGEES

Probably responsible for the modification in her refugee policy is Israel's realization that a solution is favorable to her own interests because it will limit Arab utilization of a humanitarian issue for propaganda purposes. Furthermore, Israel knows that if in the near future she agrees, or is forced for political reasons, to restore all or most of the west bank to Jordan, the "new realities" of the Arab refugee problem will disappear and the status quo antebellum will be restored. Consequently, she must act quickly to decrease the camp populations by integrating them into the Arab communities in her occupied territories. Another solution may be found if Israel maintains control of her occupied areas for one or two years, or if a separate Palestinian state in a semiautonomous relationship with the Jewish state is established on the west bank. If this should happen, the entire refugee problem may be much altered and may eventually disappear. Meanwhile, realistic and pragmatic attempts to ease the plight of the Arab refugee may advance the possibility of an eventual Arab-Israeli understanding.

²⁹ *The New York Times*, June 13, 1967, p. 19; June 23, 1967, p. 11; July 15, 1967, p. 2; July 19, 1967, p. 3; July 20, 1967, p. 2.

THE U.S. IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

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the Middle East was roughly unchanged. The positions of Israel and the Arab states had been relatively hardened, with some few signs of possible adjustment; and there was little to indicate that the attitudes of the greater powers had undergone significant change. U Thant perhaps summed up the problems as well as anyone, in the introduction to his annual report. There was, he thought, "near unanimity" on "the immediate and urgently challenging issue" of the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories of neighboring Arab states, since "there should be no territorial gains by military conquest." It would "lead to disastrous consequences if the United Nations were to abandon or compromise this fundamental principle," and would signify a return to the law of the jungle.

MULTI-SIDED PROBLEM

But U Thant noted that the issue of withdrawal lost much of its support "when taken alone by separating it from other vital issues and particularly that of national security." Arab unwillingness to accept existence of the state of Israel, insistence on maintaining a state of belligerence, and the question of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal were also fundamental issues, even though there was much agreement in principle. There was also the grave and persistent problem of some 1,346,000 Arab refugees, to whose numbers some 350,000 would now have to be added. The right of every state to exist had to be recognized, and people everywhere had "a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future," a principle which certainly applied to the Arab refugees. Granted the complexities of all these and other problems, such as Arab infiltration across the demarcation lines and Israeli retaliation and the intense national emotions involved, the Secretary General considered international effort, assistance and

concerted action indispensable to any moves towards possible solutions and to prevention of further recourse to armed force.

How well, if at all, U Thant's principles would be applied remained to be seen. The summit conference at Khartoum in August-September, 1967, did not commit the Arab states either to recognition or to negotiations with Israel, although it did not close the door to adjustments, on a *de facto* basis, to a very real and immediate situation. Israel insisted on direct negotiations with her defeated enemies, and appeared to harden her position in September. Moreover, Israel announced on September 15 that settlers would be moved into the Etzion bloc of settlements on the west bank of the Jordan River and into the Golan Heights in Syria, a move which occasioned a public rebuke from the United States.

OTHER ISSUES

Concentration on the Arab-Israeli conflict almost obscured the other issues in the Middle East. The Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey, in which both the United Kingdom and the United States were much interested, was no nearer solution. Both Turkey and Iran, allies of the United States, maneuvered in the direction of the U.S.S.R., although there were no indications of fundamental change in foreign policy. While Arab oil was cut off from the West temporarily, access was restored by the end of the summer. The United Kingdom prepared to give up its control in Aden, which was rocked by disorders, although the federative scheme it had postulated was now out of the picture. There appeared a prospect of U.A.R. withdrawal of troops from Yemen, thanks to more pressing U.A.R. needs and to a new Saudi-U.A.R. agreement in September.

At the end of 1967, one could be certain only that the Middle East would change, and that very complex problems in that troubled area would continue. But some facts seemed fairly clear as a result of the tragic six days in June. The U.S.S.R. had suffered heavily as a result of the Israeli victory over Soviet arms in Arab hands. But it also gained significantly, by identifying itself as a "friend"

of the Arab states, and it was untroubled by its "defeats" in the United Nations, whatever contrary impression was headlined in the American press.

The United States, rightly or wrongly, gave the impression of identifying American interest with that of Israel, infuriated Arab nationalists, dismayed the more moderate pro-Western "friends" of the United States in the Arab world, and may have put in jeopardy its long-standing cultural and economic interests, to say nothing of its more recent politico-strategic interests (if there still be such) in the Middle East. More realistic, better balanced and more carefully considered policies, taking into account both the immediate and the longer-range realities, coupled with the probability that no Arab people is intent on surrendering its independence even to the U.S.S.R., may yet hold promise for the future, although the decline of Western influence in the Middle East has long been rather obvious.

ISRAEL'S DILEMMA

Israel won another military *blitzkrieg* and a victory in Western public opinion, but faced very serious dilemmas. What was she to do with the large conquered Arab territories and an additional million Arabs under her control? If the Arabs were incorporated into the state of Israel in full equality, even under a revived and unified Palestine, the character of Israel as a "Jewish" state would be threatened. Conversion of the conquered territories into a kind of Arabian Rhodesia or the use of an *apartheid* system—whatever the twentieth century verbiage for a nineteenth century policy—would lead ultimately to disaster.

The Arab states have suffered another disaster, in which modern technology and organization were victorious. But the Arab world, too, is undergoing rapid change under the impact of nationalism, education and modern technology. Unless practical, viable and equitable "solutions" for all the Middle East's problems are found, with the assistance of outside powers and preferably through the United Nations, trouble still lies ahead.

SOVIET POSTURE

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the strait, it became clear that the operation would be fraught with serious dangers. The Johnson Administration than attempted to persuade the maritime powers to issue a declaration on the international waterway status of the Gulf of Aqaba; this also failed.

When, on May 26, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban met with President Johnson and pressed for the fulfillment of the 1956 United States promise, the President reportedly asked for two weeks to see if action could be taken in the Security Council. According to Israeli sources, the President promised that the United States would act unilaterally should all efforts fail. Subsequently, all efforts failed, and the United States was saved the embarrassment, if not the danger, of acting unilaterally by the outbreak of war June 5.

ISRAEL'S MISCALCULATIONS

Israel miscalculated by believing that the war could be avoided through the efforts of the great powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union.

Even when the crucial moment arrived, the Israeli leaders hoped that an open conflict could be avoided despite rapidly moving events. According to Israeli sources, Abba Eban urged his government to delay all military action until Israel could warn the United States and the other powers that she would have to resist the closure of the strait. Eban's meeting with President Johnson produced no tangible results, and he returned to Jerusalem on May 27.

Yet Israel still believed that Nasser could be prevailed upon and she pinned her hopes on the Soviet Union. At 2 A. M. on May 28, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was awakened by Soviet Ambassador Dmitri Chuvakin and presented with a note from Moscow which amounted to an ultimatum. It accused Israel of conspiring with the im-

perialist powers and of concentrating troops on the Egyptian and Syrian borders. Eshkol replied that, as regards the Egyptian border, Egypt had massed great numbers of troops in Sinai, but there were no Israeli troops on the Syrian border. He offered to provide transportation for the Russian ambassador to the Syrian border so that Chuvakin could convince himself of the truth; indeed, if necessary, Eshkol was ready to accompany the ambassador. The Prime Minister also offered to fly to Moscow and explain Israel's position to the Soviet leaders. None of the Israeli offers were accepted.⁵ As the tension rose and the outbreak of hostilities became inevitable, Israel still tried to avert the catastrophe. On June 3, Levi Eshkol sent a note to Moscow asking for Soviet help in easing the crisis.

AN ASSESSMENT

Taking advantage of the animosity between the Arabs and Israel, playing on the former's suspicion of the Western powers as their former colonial masters, and charging Israel with attempting to bring down, at the command of their imperialist masters, the progressive regimes of Egypt and Syria, the Soviet leaders hoped to push the West completely out of the Middle East. By promoting President Nasser to Arab leadership, the Kremlin hoped to extend the power of the "progressive socialist" states in the area, overthrow the reactionary monarchical regimes, and gain control of their important oil resources. Not only were the Western powers, especially the United States, standing in the way of the Communist march in the area but that march was blocked also by such monarchical states as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iran and even Jordan. With Nasser in control, thanks to Soviet efforts, he would dutifully follow Moscow's bidding. However, Soviet policy completely collapsed because of Israel's determination and because of the United States refusal to repeat its 1956 action.

It has been asserted that the Kremlin policy makers knew in advance that the Arabs would be disastrously defeated and that they cynically and maliciously urged the

⁵ *The New York Times*, July 10, 1967.

Arabs on to war and sacrificed them and their own \$2 billion in arms and equipment to make the Arabs totally dependent on the Soviet Union. This would permit Communist elements to come to power in the various countries in the Middle East.

The realities do not bear this out. It may safely be assumed that Soviet intelligence reports established the superior quality and organization of the Israeli military forces and reported the high technical ability of the Israelis and the level of the general morale of the country. They no doubt also listed all the limitations of the Arab armed forces. The Soviet Union might also have known that should it come to a show-down Israel would emerge victorious. But it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would cynically sacrifice its \$2 billion in arms and other supplies.

The Arabs, especially the "progressive socialists" with whom Moscow was to build a Communist Middle East, expressed bitter disappointment with the outcome of the war and felt that they had been betrayed by Moscow's unwillingness to join the Arabs directly in battle. Indeed, even though Moscow began to send to Egypt heavy shipments of arms and other supplies right after the end of the war, the quantity replaced was rather small in magnitude—Moscow has displayed no plans to replace the total Arab losses. But perhaps the greatest defeat for the Soviet Union came at the Khartoum conference of the heads of Arab states, which convened in late August.

Supposedly called to consider means of righting the wrong committed against the Arabs by Israel and her imperialist supporters, in reality the conference was called to devise ways of saving Nasser and his "progressive socialist" United Arab Republic from complete economic collapse. The saviours turned out to be the reactionaries, and the conference was a complete humiliation to Nasser and more than an embarrassing defeat to the Soviet Union.

Nasser was eased out of Yemen; while in practical terms this relieved exhausted Egypt of the financial burden of maintaining a 40,000-man army there, politically it was a

heavy blow to Nasser's prestige and an open admission of his failure to gain control even of Yemen let alone the entire Arabian Peninsula. The conference established a \$392-million fund to aid Jordan and the U. A. R. The three major contributors to the fund were Saudi Arabia with \$154 million, Kuwait with \$140 million and Libya with \$85 million, all the countries which Nasser had hoped to take over. Nasser was to be dependent on a dole from his erst-while reactionary enemy, Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, for his very existence. Finally, the conference decided to permit each oil-producing country to develop and apply its own policy as regards sales of oil. This meant that those countries who were to help Jordan and Egypt would sell their oil to the only available purchasers, the Western powers, from whom would come the monies for the fund.

The Soviet Union could not cynically have planned such a defeat. It must be obvious that Nasser's willingness to accept aid from the reactionary monarchies resulted from the Soviet decision not to extend the help Nasser needed for his survival. Clearly, the Kremlin had agonizingly reappraised its Middle Eastern policy as a result of the June disaster and was unwilling to resupply the Arabs with another \$2 billion in economic and military supplies.

In assessing the results of the June war, we must recognize that it brought about basic changes and new realities in the relations between the Arabs and Israel, which will no doubt have far-reaching consequences. But we should also be aware that the war produced basic changes in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East. The Soviet Union challenged the West and its interests in the area and only through sheer determination and with superior organization did Israel accept the challenge; in so doing Israel prevented the Middle East from becoming a second Vietnam. As a result of Israel's effort, the Western position has improved, and the United States can afford the luxury of doing nothing. It is the Soviet Union which is now in search of a new policy.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of October, 1967, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Oct. 27—*The New York Times* reports that 5 members of the European Atomic Energy Community have reached general agreement on the provisions of Article III, regarding inspection and control (formerly left blank). France, Euratom's 6th member, does not intend to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

European Economic Community

Oct. 24—Speaking in the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson criticizes a statement made yesterday in Luxembourg by French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville regarding Britain's application to join the Common Market. Among the conditions laid down by Couve de Murville for British entry are the abandonment of sterling as a world reserve currency and an end to Britain's balance of payments difficulties.

European Free Trade Association

Oct. 26—At a 1-day ministerial meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, the EFTA nations discuss British entry into the E.E.C. and U.S. protectionist attitudes.

Middle East Crisis

Oct. 2—In the U.N. General Assembly, Jordanian Foreign Minister Muhammad A. el-Aamiry accuses Israel of ignoring 3 U.N. resolutions on the status of Jerusalem and the Arab refugees.

Oct. 3—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, replying to Israel's critics before the General Assembly, declares that the 1949 armistice agreements no longer exist and that a peaceful settlement must be renegotiated.

Oct. 11—In an interview, Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol declares that the Soviet Union has rearmed the U.A.R. to 80 per cent of the level existing before the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967.

Oct. 22—The Israeli destroyer *Elath* is sunk by Egyptian missiles off the northern coast of Sinai. A Cairo radiobroadcast accuses the *Elath* of having entered Egyptian territorial waters.

Commodore Shlomo Erel, commander of the Israeli navy, declares that Soviet missiles, probably the most advanced type available in the U.S.S.R., were used against the *Elath*.

Oct. 23—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asserts that Arab-Israeli hostilities have been renewed by Egypt's attack on the *Elath*.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk confers in Washington with Abba Eban on the sinking of the *Elath*.

Oct. 24—In a 3-hour exchange of Arab-Israeli fire across the southern end of the Suez Canal, vital fuel tanks and 2 refineries in the U.A.R. port city of Suez are destroyed by Israeli shells.

The Soviet Union requests a Security Council meeting to discuss the latest developments in the Middle East.

The United States State Department announces that the U.S. will relax its embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East. Jet fighter planes and military equipment—all ordered before the June war—will be sent to Israel and to 5 pro-Western Arab countries.

Oct. 25—Following Security Council debate on the Middle East crisis, a resolution is adopted decrying all violations of the cease-fire.

Oct. 26—Chief U.S. Representative to the

U.N. Arthur J. Goldberg opens consultations with heads of other delegations on a resolution to send a U.N. representative, mediator or messenger to the Middle East.

Oct. 27—Dayan declares that Israel considers the cease-fire with the U.A.R. to be in force; the shelling of the 2 refineries in Suez was a retaliation for the attack on the *Elath*.

Oct. 30—Opening the winter session of the *Knессет* (parliament), Eshkol says that Israel "will consolidate her position" in the territories seized in June until a permanent peace is directly negotiated with the Arab states.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Oct. 10—According to officials in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, during 1968 the U.S. will be short 1 troop division of the 5 divisions that it has pledged to have ready to send to Europe in the event of a major war. The U.S. reduction of its military commitment to NATO is a result of the increased troop strength ordered for Vietnam.

Oct. 16—Belgian Premier Paul Vanden Boeynants formally presents NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio with the new NATO headquarters near the Brussels International Airport.

United Nations

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis, War in Vietnam; Laos and Zambia*)

Oct. 9—Some 102 countries pledge a record total of \$184 million to the U.N. Development Program for 1968.

Oct. 13—The President of the U.N. General Assembly, Cornelius Manescu, announces that the General Assembly debate on the Middle East, scheduled for October 16, has been postponed and that the Assembly will take a short recess.

Oct. 21—In a report to the General Assembly's Committee on Budget and Administration, U.N. Secretary General U Thant proposes that the top echelon of the Secretariat be reorganized.

War in Vietnam

Oct. 3—An article in the official North Vietnamese Communist party newspaper, *Nhan Dan*, rejects U.S. conditional offers to halt the bombing of North Vietnam.

Oct. 4—U.S. planes fly 106 bombing missions over North Vietnam; U.S. pilots report an attack on the power plant at Hongai, North Vietnam's 2d largest port.

Oct. 5—At the U.N. General Assembly, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman scores those who urge the U.S. to end unconditionally its bombing of North Vietnam.

Oct. 6—Indian Defense Minister Swaran Singh tells the U.N. General Assembly that India has received a "positive response" from Hanoi that leads his government to believe that North Vietnam will react favorably to an unconditional bombing cessation.

Oct. 15—A U.S. military spokesman announces that yesterday U.S. planes struck 5 new target areas in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

Oct. 19—In an editorial broadcast over the Hanoi radio, *Nhan Dan* rejects peace proposals made by Rusk at a news conference on October 12. At his news conference, Rusk repeated President Lyndon Johnson's bid in San Antonio, Texas, on September 29, 1967, to call off all bombing of North Vietnam as a prelude to "productive discussions," provided North Vietnam did not use the bombing halt to rebuild her military power.

Oct. 24—U.S. air force, navy and marine pilots bomb the Phucyen air field for the first time. Reportedly, it is the only base at which the 1,500-mile-an-hour MIG-21 jet planes are housed.

Oct. 26—A 32,000 kilowatt thermal power plant in Hanoi, the largest in North Vietnam, is bombed by U.S. navy pilots.

Oct. 28—On the 5th successive day of round-the-clock bombing raids in the area of Hanoi, 5 U.S. planes are reported to have been shot down, according to North Vietnamese broadcasts.

Oct. 31—Protesting what she terms the "con-

tinuous bombing" of Hanoi, North Vietnam asks all governments to "stay the hand of the United States"; in the space of a few days, she charges, more than 200 civilians have been killed.

AFGHANISTAN

Oct. 11—Premier Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwall and his cabinet resign. Minister of State Abdullah Yakta becomes the acting premier.

ARGENTINA

(See also *France*)

Oct. 14—Minister of the Economy Adalbert Krieger Vasena announces he will ban the sale and consumption of beef Monday and Tuesday of each week for 1 month because of a beef shortage due to frost, drought and record floods.

AUSTRALIA

Oct. 8—Prime Minister Harold Holt announces that the government is opening an Office of Aboriginal Affairs, to promote the eventual integration of aborigines into Australian community life.

Oct. 11—Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato arrives for a 4-day visit.

BOLIVIA

Oct. 10—The army high command officially confirms that Cuban guerrilla leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara was killed in a clash between guerrillas and the Bolivian army 2 days ago. The armed forces commander, Alfredo Ovando Candia, says Guevara admitted his identity before dying. Identification of the body was made by fingerprinting.

Oct. 11—Régis Debray, French Marxist writer, abandons his defense against charges of rebellion, murder and armed robbery in connection with guerrilla activity in Bolivia. Sobbing over the death of Guevara, he tells a group of Bolivian law students he wishes to share the responsibility for guerrilla activity.

Oct. 16—Bolivian military sources state there are only 6 guerrillas of the Cuban-inspired

National Army of Liberation remaining in the country.

Oct. 18—The military prosecution ends the formal presentation of its case against Debray and 5 others accused of guerrilla activity.

BRAZIL

Oct. 6—The Soviet Union and Brazil sign 2 loan agreements providing the equivalent of \$163,223 in assistance to Brazilian technical schools which will enable Brazil to purchase Soviet electronic equipment and machinery.

CANADA

Oct. 5—Soviet nuclear scientist Boris Dotzenko discloses that he applied for permanent Canadian residence 2 months ago. The Canadian government has granted him a 1-year extension of his visitor's visa; his application for permanent residence will be reviewed at the end of the 1-year period.

Oct. 14—At its annual meeting, the Quebec Liberal Federation unanimously votes to reject separatism.

Oct. 21—The Quebec Legislature passes emergency legislation ending a 29-day-old mass transit strike in Montreal. The settlement requires wage increases as well as heavy fines and jail sentences for members and officials of the 4 unions involved.

CHILE

(See *France*)

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Oct. 1—National Day parades and speeches mark the 18th anniversary of the Chinese Communist government.

Oct. 3—*Agence France-Presse* reports that Anna Louise Strong's latest monthly *Letter From China* discloses that a "top tiny handful" of leaders dismissed from office during the Cultural Revolution "still draw their salaries." (Miss Strong is an American Marxist living in Peking.)

Oct. 17—A *Hsinhua* (official press agency) report states that the grain harvest in

Heilungkiang Province is 10 per cent higher this year than last year. The "proletarian (pro-Mao) revolutionaries" control the province.

Oct. 31—The government announces it is withdrawing its economic aid mission in Burma; its diplomatic staff returns from Indonesia.

COLOMBIA

Oct. 8—Some 14,000 Colombian bank workers stage a protest against delays in negotiation of a new contract by arriving at work in shabby clothes.

Oct. 10—The Communist party announces it will enter the congressional elections next month under the Liberal party label. Only Liberal and Conservative parties can hold congressional seats.

Oct. 19—The Supreme Court restores the rights of the former president and dictator, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who was stripped of his political rights 8 years ago by the Senate.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

Oct. 6—The director general of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Roger Gallopin, announces that the committee will probably begin to evacuate the white mercenaries from the Congo to Malta in a few weeks; approximately 950 Katangese gendarmes will be evacuated to Zambia. Gallopin says that President Joseph Mobutu has promised amnesty to gendarmes returning to the Congo.

Oct. 22—Lawrence Fellows of *The New York Times* reports that the foreign mercenary leader, Colonel Jean Schramme, has indicated that the mercenaries will not be evacuated from Bukavu by the Red Cross.

CUBA

(See also *Bolivia*)

Oct. 3—Cuba begins rationing bananas, oranges, lemons and avocados.

Oct. 18—In a Havana memorial rally 500,000 Cubans pay tribute to Guevara.

Oct. 30—In a speech delivered in Bayamo in

Oriente Province, Premier Fidel Castro announces an apparent return to a centralized system of agriculture: farm machinery will be largely concentrated in the hands of agricultural brigades, instead of being distributed throughout the country; the army will play a greater role in agricultural work.

FINLAND

Oct. 12—In an attempt to restore economic balance, reduce unemployment and protect economic growth, the government announces that the *markka* will be devalued by 31.25 per cent.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C.*)

Oct. 2—Results from yesterday's local runoff elections show that the Communists have almost doubled their representation in general councils.

Oct. 3—It is reported from Washington that the French government will sell Mirage V fighter-bombers to Peru and 50 AMX-30 tanks to Argentina.

Oct. 10—In Paris, the French-Chilean Mixed Commission announces that France will supply Chile with helicopters, an atomic research reactor and agricultural aid.

Oct. 12—Highway and railroad traffic between Limoges and Paris is blocked by farmers protesting government farm policies.

Oct. 23—Czechoslovak Premier Josef Lenart and Foreign Minister Vaclav David arrive in Paris for 4 days of talks with Premier Georges Pompidou and Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

Oct. 26—Jordan's King Hussein visits with President Charles de Gaulle.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Oct. 1—In Bremen's parliamentary elections the extreme right-wing National Democratic party wins 9 per cent of the vote—the highest total the party has received in 6 state elections. The Social Democrats lose their 8-year majority; the Christian Democratic Union's strength remains about

the same. The Free Democrats increase their seats by about 2 per cent.

Oct. 6—Foreign Minister Willy Brandt calls for a restoration of normal relations between his country and the Soviet Union.

Oct. 12—Brandt and Soviet Ambassador Semyon Sarapkin reopen talks.

Oct. 19—Voting 81 to 38 (with 3 abstentions), the West Berlin Parliament elects Under Secretary of State Klaus Schütz as mayor of West Berlin, succeeding Heinrich Albertz, who resigned September 26.

Oct. 24—Chairman of the West German Communist party Max Reimann discloses that he has sent a letter to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger asking for legal status for his party.

The Ministry of the Interior issues a statement declaring that the Communist party cannot presently be reinstated as a legal organization.

GREECE

Oct. 2—Former Premier Panayotis Canellopoulos is arrested, following his antigovernment statements of September 27 and 29.

Oct. 4—Athens publisher Helen Vlachos is arrested for a second time (she was arrested on September 28 and subsequently released).

It is disclosed that within the last 2 weeks approximately 50 students have been arrested.

Oct. 7—Minister of Public Order Pavlos Totomis says that former Premier George Papandreu and 8 other political figures are no longer under government detention. However, the government will continue to eradicate any attempts to disturb "the peace and tranquility of the country."

Oct. 9—King Constantine agrees to the retirement of 144 army officers. The junta has been anxious to remove from the army any possible royalist elements.

Oct. 16—The regime decrees that newspapers can no longer publish "anti-American Vietnam news," information about politicians prominent before the April 21, 1967, coup or anything favorable to Communist countries.

Oct. 19—The government accuses the U.S. of aiding "Communist plans" by suspending military aid to Greece.

Oct. 24—The cabinet ratifies a \$1.5-million budget for 1967.

GUINEA

Oct. 2—In a speech before the closing session of the 8th congress of the Guinea Democratic party, President Sékou Touré announces that all political prisoners will be released immediately.

The congress passes reforms aimed at aiding Guinean women; the reforms abolish polygamy and place a 20-year limit on the age difference between husband and wife.

INDIA

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Oct. 1—Indian and Communist Chinese troops exchange fire on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

Oct. 4—The Congress party is forced to resign from power in the federally-administered territory of Manipur. An opposition coalition government will take control October 5.

Oct. 8—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi leaves for Moscow, beginning a 2-week trip to the Communist East European countries and the U.A.R.

INDONESIA

(See also *China*)

Oct. 1—About 1,000 youths ransack the Chinese Communist embassy and set fire to one of the buildings.

Oct. 10—The Foreign Ministry announces that diplomatic relations with Communist China will be suspended.

Oct. 11—Acting President General Suharto reshuffles his cabinet; the 5-man presidium is abolished; Suharto retains the influential cabinet position of minister coordinator for defense and security.

Oct. 25—The Indonesian embassy in Peking is closed.

IRAN

Oct. 26—Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, the Shah,

crowns himself and his wife. Empress Farah is Iran's first crowned queen.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Oct. 22—The Finance Ministry announces that Israel will construct a 42-inch oil pipeline, with a 50-million ton per year capacity, between Elath and Ashdod (a port on the Mediterranean), to serve as an alternative route for Suez Canal crude-oil traffic.

ITALY

Oct. 26—It is reported in Washington that the U.S. Defense Department will allow Italy to build and distribute M47 tanks to NATO and other friendly nations.

JAPAN

(See also *Australia, Philippines and South Vietnam*)

Oct. 19—The government reports that Japanese economic aid to developing countries increased in 1966 by 10.9 per cent over 1965. Aid in 1966 totaled \$538 million.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Oct. 5—King Hussein ends a state visit to Moscow. A joint communiqué gives no indication of military aid from the Soviet Union. Both parties express the desire for closer economic relations.

It is reported that Jordan and the U.S.S.R. have signed a cultural and scientific cooperation agreement.

Oct. 7—Hussein installs a new cabinet; pro-West Premier Saad Jumaa is replaced by Bahjat al-Talhoumi who advocates co-operation with the U.A.R. Talhoumi is also named minister of defense and foreign affairs. The newly-created post of minister for religious affairs and holy places is given to Sheik Abdel-Hamid as-Sayeh, who was the chief justice of the high Muslim court in Jerusalem.

Oct. 8—The King announces that he is taking direct control of the armed forces.

Oct. 9—Hussein abolishes the military posts of commander in chief and deputy com-

mander in chief, thus removing Marshal Habes Majali and Lieutenant General Sherif Nasser Ben Jamil, respectively.

Oct. 14—In a further step to reorganize the military, the cabinet retires 40 army officers.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Oct. 7—United States sources report that North Korean gunners opened fire yesterday on a U.S. patrol boat in the Imjin River. Officials say the boat was 880 yards south of the boundary dividing North and South Korea. One soldier is missing.

LAOS

Oct. 6—In an interview in Paris, where he is meeting with de Gaulle, Premier Souvanna Phouma states that cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam depends on U.S. action, but that Laos wants "both sides to stop the fighting. . . ."

Oct. 13—The government displays 19 captured North Vietnamese soldiers as evidence of North Vietnam's military intervention in Laos.

Phouma addresses the U.N. General Assembly; he details North Vietnamese military activity in Laos.

MALAYSIA

Oct. 14—Prime Minister Abdul Rahman discloses that his government intends to establish diplomatic relations with the Communist bloc countries.

MEXICO

Oct. 29—President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz gives land titles to 2.5 million acres of land in Chihuahua State to 9,600 peasant families, in action officially described as the largest distribution of land in Mexico. The land for the most part is semiarid desert and comes from the breaking up of cattle-raising estates. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

MOROCCO

Oct. 6—King Hassan II announces a reorganization of the military, giving him greater control over the armed forces.

NIGERIA

Oct. 4—The Nigerian radio announces that Enugu, the capital of Biafra, has been seized by federal troops.

Oct. 7—A Biafran plane attempting to bomb Lagos is shot down by federal troops.

Oct. 19—Military spokesmen report that federal troops have invaded the key port of Calabar.

Oct. 20—Biafra establishes a private mission in Lisbon.

Oct. 26—It is disclosed that federal soldiers killed the first positively identified white mercenary in Biafran uniform on October 23.

Oct. 30—Head of the federal government Major General Yakubu Gowon accuses Portugal of being the major supplier of arms to Biafra.

PAKISTAN

Oct. 13—It is announced in Karachi that telecommunications will be restored between India and Pakistan on November 1.

PERU

(See also *France*)

Oct. 23—*The New York Times* reports that President Fernando Belaúnde Terry conferred last week with Victor Paul Hava de la Torre and Manuel A. Odria, 2 opposition leaders, in an attempt to solve Peru's serious economic problems.

Oct. 25—Strikes over rising living costs continue to spread in Peru amid rumors that a military coup is imminent if the President fails to solve growing labor problems. The strikes and outbreaks of violence have come in the wake of the devaluation of the *sol* which dropped from 28.6 to 40 to the dollar after the Central Bank withdrew its support from the exchange market.

PHILIPPINES

Oct. 18—Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato arrives in Manila for a 3-day state visit.

PORTUGAL

(See also *Nigeria*)

Oct. 21—It is reported in Lisbon that the Portuguese and Malawi governments agreed this week to a policy of cooperation without political considerations.

SPAIN

Oct. 10—In a moderate turnout, voters elect 19 per cent of the deputies to the *Cortes* (parliament) in the first direct parliamentary election in 31 years.

Oct. 11—Results from yesterday's election show that some independent candidates defeated pro-government candidates.

Oct. 27—Workers and students demonstrating against the government's censorship and its economic policies in Madrid and Barcelona are restrained by security forces.

Oct. 31—Informed sources report that last week Spain delivered 10 of 175 contracted trucks to Poland and shipped steel to Rumania.

A Russian naval training vessel arrives in Barcelona.

SWITZERLAND

Oct. 31—Complete returns from the October 29 parliamentary election reveal that the 4-party ruling coalition has been returned to office for another 4-year term, controlling 165 of the 200 seats.

THAILAND

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Oct. 4—The Interior Ministry announces an increase in military operations against Communist guerrillas in central Thailand.

Oct. 15—The government announces that the first elections since 1957 will be held in December. Voters will choose municipal council members.

TUNISIA

Oct. 5—In an interview in West Germany, President Habib Bourguiba urges Arab leaders to stop "indulging the passions of the masses" and realistically recognize Israel's existence. He also appeals to Israel for an understanding of Arab sentiments.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Canada, Jordan, U.A.R. and Vietnam, Democratic Republic of*)

Oct. 10—The government announces an increase of \$2.4 billion in its defense budget for 1968, and an increase in production of consumer goods over heavy industrial goods.

Oct. 12—The Supreme Soviet (parliament) accepts unanimously the new draft law calling for an extension of military service and the training of more citizens, including high school boys. However, there will be a 1-year cut in the term of compulsory service.

Oct. 18—A space capsule is dropped by the Venus 4 rocket onto the surface of the planet Venus. *Tass* (official press agency) reports that preliminary findings show that Venus' atmosphere consists primarily of carbon dioxide.

Oct. 21—It is disclosed in the U.S. that the Soviet Union is building its first aircraft carrier.

Oct. 30—Two Cosmos space satellites succeed in the first unmanned docking in space.

Oct. 31—The government announces a sweeping amnesty freeing thousands of prisoners and halving the prison terms of many others; writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel are excluded because they are in the category of those convicted of "particularly dangerous state crimes."

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; United Kingdom and Yemen*)

Oct. 5—Published reports state that former Director of Egyptian Intelligence Salah Nasr has been arrested in connection with last month's alleged suicide of Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser sends New Year's greetings to Egyptian Jews.

Oct. 29—A Soviet supply ship arrives in Port Said. Seven other ships arrived Oct. 27, 4 in Said and 3 in Alexandria.

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

Oct. 4—In a resolution presented at the Scarborough party conference, the Labour party calls on the government to "dissociate itself completely" from U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Oct. 8—Former Prime Minister Clement Attlee dies.

Oct. 15—Harold Beeley, a specialist on Arab affairs and permanent representative to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, flies to the U.A.R. in an attempt to improve relations between Britain and the U.A.R.

Oct. 22—It is reported from Cairo that Nasser has approved reopening respective embassies in London and Cairo. Diplomatic relations were severed in 1965 because of disagreement over policies concerning Rhodesia.

Oct. 24—The House of Commons gives final approval to a bill legalizing abortion.

Oct. 31—Queen Elizabeth II speaks as Parliament opens. Included in the government's legislative program is a promise to alter the "present hereditary basis" of the House of Lords. No specifics are offered.

British Territories

Hong Kong (Crown Colony)

Oct. 13—British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Lord Shepherd arrives to discuss possible improvements in Hong Kong's social welfare and labor legislation.

Oct. 14—It is reported that a British police inspector, Frank Knight, has been abducted from Hong Kong into China and that 20 persons have been injured by 35 bomb explosions in Hong Kong.

Oct. 20—The United States Consulate in Hong Kong announces that approximately 11,000 Hong Kong Chinese will begin emigrating to the U.S. starting July, 1968.

South Arabia, Federation of

Oct. 14—On the 4th anniversary of the Arab nationalist rebellion against British rule, Arabs and British troops exchange fire in Aden.

Oct. 25—The National Liberation Front urges Britain to remove her troops from Aden immediately.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Oct. 26—Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman discloses that the Administration will resume its 1961-1966 policy of paying farmers not to plant grain.

Civil Rights

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Oct. 13—President Lyndon Johnson signs an executive order to strengthen procedures guaranteeing protection to women against job discrimination in federal employment or in the employ of its private contractors.

Oct. 20—An all-white jury finds 7 men guilty of participating in a Ku Klux Klan conspiracy to murder 3 civil rights workers in Philadelphia, Mississippi, in 1964. Maximum penalty on the federal charges is 10 years in prison and a \$5,000 fine. Sentence is delayed.

Oct. 30—Martin Luther King and 3 other Negro clergymen begin to serve a 5-day jail sentence in Alabama for defying an injunction against demonstrations in Birmingham in 1963.

The Economy

Oct. 17—A special presidential commission urges adoption of a new method of estimating the federal budget, to provide a more accurate measurement of the impact of government activities on the economy and to end the confusion of the current system which draws on 3 different sets of figures.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

Oct. 5—A bipartisan group of 23 senators led by Charles Percy (R., Ill.) asks the President to try to secure more Asian military backing for the war in Vietnam.

Oct. 8—The State Department announces the recall of U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador Wymberley Coerr at Ecuador's request; Ecuador charges that Coerr was guilty of "public, open criticism" of the government of President Otto Arosemena Gómez.

Oct. 10—The President entertains Ghana's President Joseph A. Ankrah.

Oct. 12—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk warns that if it turns its back on treaty pledges to Vietnam the U.S. will be "immortal danger because of Communist China's aggressive intent."

Oct. 15—Vice President Hubert Humphrey charges that "the threat to world peace is militant, aggressive Asian Communism, with its headquarters in Peking, China"; he warns that United States security is at stake in Asia.

Oct. 16—Senator Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.) charges that Rusk has "obscured the issues" at stake in Vietnam by discussing the "yellow peril." Rusk denies that his warning about China involves racism.

Oct. 17—*The New York Times* reports that late last week Covey Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, revealed the government's plans to make F-5 tactical jets available to Latin American nations.

Oct. 21—Some 50,000 people protesting the war in Vietnam demonstrate in Washington; thousands try to enter the Pentagon and are stopped by armed deputy federal marshals and soldiers.

Almost 1,000 people attend a vigil at New York's Battery Park in support of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

Oct. 25—Former Presidents Harry S Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower join a new nonpartisan organization, Citizens' Committee for Peace With Freedom in Vietnam, supporting the Administration's Vietnam policy.

Without mentioning Rusk's remarks of October 12, the President denies that racist fears of "yellow peril" have been raised in debate on the war in Vietnam.

Oct. 26—President Johnson greets Mexican President Díaz Ordaz, an official visitor, at the White House.

Oct. 27—Díaz Ordaz addresses Congress in joint session and warns that the U.S. should consider carefully the effects of adopting restrictive trade legislation.

In El Paso, Texas, Humphrey opens a conference on Mexican-American problems.

Oct. 28—In Mexico, President Johnson turns 437 acres of land on the Rio Grande over to Mexico, in settlement of a century-old boundary dispute. Agreement on the land transfer and delineation of a new boundary was reached in 1964.

Oct. 29—Humphrey arrives in Saigon to attend the inauguration of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Government

Oct. 6—Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, asks the Administration to reappraise and reduce long-term federal spending; until such a reappraisal is undertaken, he warns that Congress will not consider a tax increase.

Oct. 11—President Johnson signs a bill authorizing a \$170-million Appalachian regional aid program, in effect extending the program for 2 years.

Oct. 20—The President signs a law setting new and stiffer penalties for persons staging demonstrations at the Capitol.

Oct. 25—Senator Edward V. Long (D., Mo.) is cleared by the Senate Ethics Committee of charges that he tried to keep James Hoffa (then president of the Teamsters) out of jail by using his investigating subcommittee's evidence on illegal wiretapping.

Oct. 26—The House passes and sends to the White House 3 appropriation bills, providing: \$4.6 billion for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration—\$502 million under the President's request; \$2.1 billion for the Departments of State, Justice and Commerce—\$172 million under the budget request; \$10.1 billion to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 18 independent agencies—\$681 million under the budget request. Reduced funds for rent subsidies and for the model cities programs are included in the appropriations for housing.

Labor

Oct. 1—Walter P. Reuther, United Automobile Workers union president, says that the cause of the Ford strike is Ford's refusal

to discuss a contract in terms of the company's profits or productivity.

Oct. 4—Violence continues in the steel-haulers' strike in Ohio, Pennsylvania and Indiana; 5 other states are affected by the owner-operator strike to persuade the Teamsters Union to negotiate a separate, more favorable contract for owner-operators.

Oct. 13—Officials of the nation's railroads say they will comply with an arbitration award made by a presidential board to settle the shopcraft labor pay dispute; the award becomes effective October 16.

Oct. 25—The U.A.W. says some 90 per cent of its production worker members have voted to accept Ford's new contract proposal; 70 per cent of its skilled workers have accepted it. Voting continues at 4 locals.

Oct. 26—Workers at 28 out of 90 plants refuse to accept the Ford contract; bargaining continues on a local basis.

Military

Oct. 4—Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell tells the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee that the Administration's restrictions on the bombing of North Vietnam have led to additional American casualties in Vietnam.

Oct. 5—The Department of Defense freezes construction of some low priority military projects, including the so-called "pork barrel" programs of river and harbor development and flood control. Affected projects are not related to the war in Vietnam.

Oct. 18—The House Armed Services Subcommittee, investigating charges of army mismanagement of the M-16 rifle program, charges that army mismanagement has been "unbelievable" and calls for a thorough review.

Politics

Oct. 9—The chairman of a special Democratic Equal Rights Committee, New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes, says that 48 out of 50 states have promised to send

racially representative delegations to the 1968 national convention. Alabama and Mississippi have not so pledged.

Science and Space

Oct. 19—Mariner 5, an unmanned U.S. Venus probe spacecraft, passes Venus and radios scientific data back to earth.

Supreme Court

Oct. 2—The 1967 term of the Supreme Court opens; Justice Thurgood Marshall, 96th justice and first Negro to sit on the Supreme Court, is sworn in.

URUGUAY

Oct. 10—The police arrest dozens of labor leaders as President Oscar D. Gestido bans protest moves by bank clerks.

Oct. 11—The Communist-led National Workers Union ignores a government ban and thousands of workers obey its call for a short general strike.

VATICAN, THE

Oct. 1—The first Synod of Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church begins. The Synod was called to advise Pope Paul VI.

Oct. 11—The Third World Congress for Lay Apostolate opens in Rome. It calls on the Catholic hierarchy to give greater freedom, autonomy and responsibility to the laity.

Oct. 18—Voting 67 to 21 (with 10 abstentions), the central body of the Catholic lay congress calls on the hierarchy to let parents decide on "scientific and technical means" of birth control.

Oct. 26—Pope Paul VI and Athenagoras I, senior prelate of Orthodox Christianity, meet and pledge continued efforts to end the schism between their churches.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Oct. 19—Soviet foreign aid administrator Semyon Skachkov promises continued aid to North Vietnam in "huge" amounts.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Oct. 3—The 116-member Constituent Assembly votes 58-43 (with 1 abstention and 4 irregular ballots) to accept the results of the controversial presidential elections of September 3, 1967. The Assembly Speaker Phan Khac Suu, a defeated presidential candidate, refuses to announce the outcome of the Assembly's vote personally.

Oct. 15—*The New York Times* reports that under the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. attitude toward the South Vietnamese government has hardened: Bunker has refused to overlook remarks or actions by the Vietnamese government embarrassing to U.S. President Johnson.

Oct. 21—Sato arrives for a brief state visit.

Oct. 23—With 118 of the 137 seats decided, it is disclosed that in yesterday's election 30 seats were won by military personnel; 25 by civil servants.

Oct. 26—President-elect Nguyen Van Thieu lowers the draft age from 20 to 18 years.

Oct. 31—Thieu is inaugurated as the first president of South Vietnam's 2d Republic. Premier Nguyen Cao Ky is sworn in as Vice President. Later, Thieu names Nguyen Van Loc, a lawyer, to serve as Premier.

YEMEN

Oct. 4—Reliable sources report that several hundred Egyptian troops have been withdrawn from Yemen and that some 1,000 more are ready for evacuation.

ZAMBIA

Oct. 5—Speaking before the U.N. General Assembly, Foreign Minister R. C. Kamanga denounces "an unholy alliance" among Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia.

Oct. 17—The government receives parliamentary approval for a 6-month extension of emergency presidential power because of Rhodesian and Portuguese military activity on Zambia's borders.

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The effect of the war on the governments of Iraq, Syria and Algeria was to speed up the process of their radicalization. In Iraq, this was expressed on July 10 by the assumption of premiership by General Taher Yahya, whose new cabinet reflected strong Socialist and Pan-Arab tendencies. One of the first and truly symbolic acts of this new cabinet was to pass Law No. 97 on August 7, whereby the areas previously seized from the Iraq Petroleum Company (a Western concern) were transferred to the government-owned Iraqi National Oil Company. Iraq's extreme position on the issue of a boycott has already been mentioned.

Syria's Baath regime, basically hostile to the West, intensified this hostility, and her absence from the summit conference in Khartoum placed her in self-imposed isola-

tion, accompanied by the forging of closer ties with the Communist bloc.

Boumedienne's absence from Khartoum indicated that Algeria was also determined to strike out for herself and that she remained unmoved by the appeals for moderation. In a symbolic gesture similar to that of Iraq, in August the Algerian regime nationalized a number of Western oil-distributing companies.

In conclusion, it appears that although the old dichotomy between the conservative and the radical camps has been maintained in its broad outlines, both camps have experienced inner realignments. In the conservative camp, Jordan began exploring the possibility of closer ties to Moscow. In the radical camp, the U.A.R.'s erstwhile primacy has been dimmed while she accepted compromise with the conservative camp; at the same time other voices—in Damascus and Algiers especially—began to advocate policies more militant and intransigent than those favored by war-weary Egypt.